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The Supreme Court's
"Intermediate" Equal Protection
Decisions: Five Imperfect Models
of Constitutional Equality
By JEFFREY H. BLATTNER*
"No State shall ... deny to any person ... the equal protection
of the laws.""
"Once loosed, the idea of Equality is not easily cabined. '
2
"Judges cannot make us equal."'
3
Introduction
During the past decade, the Supreme Court abandoned the
"rigid two-tier"4 analysis of legislative and administrative classifi-
cations that dominated the equal protection decisions of the War-
ren era.6 The Court supplemented the virtual prohibition against
* B.A., 1975, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1980, Harvard University. Member, Dis-
trict of Columbia Bar. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Laurence H. Tribe
for his helpful comments and suggestions during the preparation of an earlier draft of this
essay. Errors are mine alone.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and
the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 H~nv. L. REV. 91 (1966).
3. Wright, Judicial Review and the Equal Protection Clause, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 28 (1980).
4. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
5. Under the "two-tier" regime, statutory classifications based on race or national ori-
gin, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), or those inhibiting the exercise of a
"fundamental right," see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), were constitution-
ally permissible only if necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. See Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1087-1132 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Developments]. Any other classification was permissible unless it "rest[ed] on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." McGowan v. Mary-
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legislation that discriminates on the basis of race or national ori-
gin," or that infringes upon "fundamental interests,"7 with a vari-
ety of intermediate approaches used to strike down some, but not
all, classifications that discriminated on the basis of gender,' alien-
age,9 and illegitimate birth,10 or that hamper certain "semi-funda-
mental" interests.11
The Court's explicit extension of protection to groups12 other
than racial and ethnic minorities is significant because it signals a
clear departure from the once widely held view that the Four-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). The Warren Court's equal protection decisions are dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 46-63 infra.
6. The only instances in which the Court has upheld government classifications based
on national origin are Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the in-
ternment of Americans of Japanese ancestry immediately after Pearl Harbor), and Hiraba-
yashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding curfew for persons of Japanese heri-
tage). In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the Court held that a provision
requiring that, in the absence of an administrative waiver, at least ten percent of the federal
funds granted for state or local public works projects must be used by the recipient to ob-
tain services or goods furnished by a "minority business enterprise" owned, at least in part,
by citizens "who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos or Aleuts" did
not violate the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. See notes 101-19 and ac-
companying text infra. See also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J., and opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concur-
ring and dissenting)(state university medical school may consider the race of its applicants
in attempting to obtain academically diverse student body).
7. The Court has upheld minimal interferences with fundamental interests. See, e.g.,
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) (upholding provision of Social Security Act terminating
certain disability benefits if the recipient marries person not entitled to disability benefits
under Act, despite adverse impact on the right to marry); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679
(1973) (per curiam) (upholding fifty-day voter residency requirement despite its impact on
right of interstate travel).
8. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See
also notes 122-40 and accompanying text infra.
9. Although the Supreme Court has announced that "classifications based on alienage,
like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
scrutiny," Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971)(footnote omitted), recent
cases indicate the emergence of a far less "suspicious" analysis of some alienage-based clas-
sifications. See, e.g., United States v. Clair, 100 S. Ct. 895 (1980); Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). The Court's alienage decisions are
discussed in text accompanying notes 71-77 infra.
10. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
11. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (legislation imposing greater
restrictions on the ability of unmarried persons to purchase contraceptives violated equal
protection clause).
12. As used herein, "groups" refers simply to all of those individuals possessing a par-
ticular identifying characteristic. A more detailed discussion of the significance of social and
political groups is included in text accompanying notes 298-307 infra.
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teenth Amendment condemns only racial discrimination," the evil
it was primarily,14 but not exclusively,1 5 intended to eradicate. 16 In
determining the scope of protection afforded by the clause, how-
ever, the Burger Court has failed to articulate a meaningful ratio-
nale explaining why some characteristics and activities are entitled
to heightened judicial solicitude while classifications disadvantag-
ing other, arguably similar, attributes and endeavors are denied
more than minimal protection. As several commentators have
noted,17 the Court's failure to develop a consistent explanation for
its treatment of cases arising under the equal protection clause re-
flects an underlying uncertainty about the nature of the limitations
the provision places on the powers of the states and the federal
government. 8 This has resulted in what one observer has de-
scribed as "an accumulation of ad hoc doctrines flexible enough to
accommodate a cautious Court's preferences for mildly progressive
results."19
This essay analyzes the Supreme Court's various "intermedi-
ate" approaches to equal protection cases. Five possible underlying
assumptions concerning the purpose and scope of the equal protec-
tion clause are developed, evaluated, and compared with the Bur-
13. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
14. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873). See Bickel, The Origi-
nal Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1, 59-63 (1955).
15. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873). Unlike the Fifteenth
Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment contains no language limiting the scope of its pro-
tection to discrimination on the basis of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
16. Recent extension of heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment to gen-
der-based classifications prompted one sympathetic commentator to observe that "[bloldly
dynamic interpretation, departing radically from the original understanding, is required to
tie to the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause a command that government
treat men and women as individuals equal in rights, responsibilities, and opportunities."
Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 161, 161.
17. See, e.g., A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
(1976). "The Justices have been notably unsuccessful in formulating viable general princi-
ples explaining their votes and imparting a measure of consistency to their decisions." Id. at
73.
18. The Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against the denial of equal protection of
the laws by a state has been held to be a part of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due
process and is therefore binding on the federal government. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975). See also Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of
Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. REV. 541 (1977).
19. Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three
Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 946 (1975).
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ger Court's equal protection decisions. Part I contains an overview
of the analytic framework developed and used by the Supreme
Court in equal protection cases decided before 1970, and a discus-
sion of the Burger Court's equal protection decisions. In Part II, a
brief note on the historical context in which an attempt to give
meaning to the equal protection clause is followed by a discussion
of five "mediating principles""0 that have been advanced as possi-
ble rationales for determining which government actions deny
"equal protection of the laws." Though each of these five models
refers to one or more values considered necessary for a just society,
all are found to be "imperfect" in that they are dependent on an
externally supplied vision of a proper allocation of rights and re-
sponsibilities among the branches of government and between the
government and the individual.1 Part III consists of a critical
analysis of the scope of protection afforded by the Burger Court to
various groups and interests under the equal protection clause.
This is followed by an evaluation of the analytic devices used by
the Supreme Court in the past decade. The Court's recent equal
protection decisions are compared with the models developed in
Part II and are found to be explicable only in terms of a judicially
concealed substantive vision, described here as "just and unjust
disadvantaging."
I. A Brief Chronicle of the Supreme Court's Equal
Protection Jurisprudence
A. Background
For nearly eighty years after its ratification in 1868, the equal
protection clause was interpreted as placing relatively few limits on
the power of state governments to favor or disfavor particular
groups within their borders.2  Throughout that period, the clause
was held to forbid only the overt or covert23 use of racial24 or eth-
20. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107
(1976).
21. See Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles
in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HAv. L. REv. 1 (1973).
22. See, e.g., The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (upholding, as
beyond the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, Louisiana's legislatively created slaughter-
house monopoly); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (upholding a state ban on
the practice of law by women).
23. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
24. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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nic25 classifications to disadvantage26 racial or ethnic minorities.
During the 1940s, the elements of the equal protection analy-
sis currently favored by the Supreme Court began to take shape.2 7
The first decision to hold that "all legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect,12
and "that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny, '2
is, ironically, one of only two decisions that upheld such a restric-
tion.30 In Korematsu v. United States,s8 a sharply divided 2 Su-
preme Court held that a military order requiring that all persons
of Japanese origin be excluded from designated areas of the west
coast was justified by "the military urgency of the situation."3 3
Despite its inauspicious beginnings, the "suspect classifica-
tion"3' doctrine served as the engine for the destruction of most 5
official race discrimination in the United States. The standard was
rigorous; in order to survive strict scrutiny, a suspect classification
had to be found "necessary to the accomplishment" 6 of an "over-
riding statutory purpose."3 7 With the exception of the infamous
wartime decisions on the treatment of Americans of Japanese de-
scent, no government action explicitly based on a racial or ethnic
classification withstood constitutional challenge before 1978.
Nearly coincident with the birth of the suspect classification
doctrine was the appearance of the second element of the judicial
25. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
26. In the absence of a showing of unequal treatment of a racial minority, the use of
overt racial classifications was permissible. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896)
(upholding "equal but separate" accommodations for whites and blacks in railroad passen-
ger cars).
27. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv.
341 (1949).
28. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
29. Id.
30. See also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). Cf. Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (discussed at text accompanying notes 101-19 infra).
31. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
32. Justices Roberts, Murphy and Jackson dissented in separate opinions. Id. at 225,
233, 242.
33. Id. at 223.
34. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27, at 356; Developments, supra note 5, at
1087-1119.
35. But see Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (upholding the closing of munic-
ipal swimming pools prompted by a federal court's order to desegregate them).
36. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
37. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
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approach to equal protection cases: strict scrutiny of classifications
that infringe upon "fundamental interests." In Skinner v.
Oklahoma,3s the Court considered an Oklahoma statute that pro-
vided for the sterilization of "habitual criminals," that is, those
persons who had been convicted three times of "crimes 'amounting
to felonies involving moral turpitude.' "9 The statute excluded
persons convicted of embezzling funds, but not persons convicted
of grand larceny.40 After reciting the litany of cases requiring the
Court to give "large deference" to classifications found in state
statutes,41 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, declared that:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the
basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamen-
tal to the very existence and survival of the race .... [S]trict
scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization
law is essential, lest unwittingly or otherwise invidious discrimi-
nations are made against groups or types of individuals in viola-
tion of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.2
Finding that Oklahoma lacked "the slightest basis"43 for its differ-
ing treatment of embezzlers and those who commit grand larceny,
the Court struck down the statute as a violation of the equal pro-
tection clause.
Skinner marked the beginning of the development of the
"fundamental interest" doctrine,44 which requires a showing that a
classification that penalizes the exercise of a "fundamental right"
is "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.' 4 5
During the Warren Court era, the list of fundamental interests
swelled to include the rights of interstate travel,'46 "equal voting
opportunity, '4 and "equal litigation opportunity.' 48
38. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
39. Id. at 536-37.
40. Id. at 537-39.
41. Id. at 540-41. See notes 50-63 and accompanying text infra.
42. 316 U.S. at 541.
43. Id. at 542.
44. See Developments, supra note 5, at 1131-32. Tussman and tenBroek referred to
this development as "substantive equal protection." Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27, at
361.
45. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis in original).
46. Id.
47. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-10 (1978). See, e.g., Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (state poll tax violated the equal protection
clause).
48. L. TRIBE, supra note 47, § 16-11. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
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The "suspect classification" and "fundamental interest" doc-
trines defined the two areas in which the Warren Court interpreted
the equal protection clause to require extraordinary justification
for legislative classifications. The "suspect classification" doctrine
effectively precluded overt distinctions on the basis of particular
characteristics. The "fundamental interest" doctrine conditioned
government regulation of specified zones of human interaction
upon its equal treatment of all those affected, regardless of their
particular characteristics. 49
The Supreme Court has used a far less critical approach in
evaluating legislative classifications outside these two areas. The
Court's deference to the judgment of the political branches has
taken two forms. First, legislation that resulted in the unequal
treatment of individuals but that did not create a classification
simply was not perceived as falling within the scope of the equal
protection clause.50 Second, any non-suspect classification passed
constitutional muster so long as it rested "on grounds [not] wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." 51 This stan-
dard, often called the "reasonable classification '52 requirement, or
simply "minimal scrutiny,"5 demanded only that the Justices re-
cite some plausible set of facts that would allow the Court to jus-
tify the statute in question.54
The minimal scrutiny standard reflected the Supreme Court's
(1963) (requiring that indigent defendants be provided with counsel for appeals as of right).
49. See L. TRmE, supra note 47, at 992-93.
50. See, e.g., Puget Sound Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 624-26 (1934). For a more re-
cent articulation of this view, see San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973). "The function of the Equal Protection Clause... is simply to measure the validity
of classifications created by state laws." Id. at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis in
original). See Clune, The Supreme Court's Treatment of Wealth Discriminations Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 1975 Sup. CT. REv. 289, 290-293. This limited conception of
equal protection prompted Professor Michelman to lament that "[u]nless [a] grievance can
be rendered into the verbal and conceptual forms of inequality and discrimination, it will
remain suspended-accusing, oppressive, and unresolved-in some moral heaven."
Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 57-58 (1969).
51. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). Before the Warren era, this re-
quirement sometimes was given more bite. Compare Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61 (1911) with F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
52. Developments, supra note 5, at 1076-87; Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27, at
344-53.
53. Gunther, supra note 4, at 8.
54. See Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645,
647 (1975).
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reluctance 5 to interfere with legislative decisions. The Court was
quick to conjure factual bases which rendered legislative classifica-
tions "rational" in deference to the fact-finding competence of
state legislatures.5" It tolerated "under-inclusiveness, 5 7 stating
that a state legislature may attempt to achieve its objectives "one
step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which
seems most acute to the legislative mind."5 s The Court's failure to
proscribe any legislative purpose other than "invidious discrimina-
tion"59 also demonstrated its avowed hesitation 0 to substitute ju-
dicial value judgments for those of the elected branches.61
Thus, at the close of the Warren Court era, the selection of
one of the two scrutinies was the beginning and end of the Court's
analysis of the constitutionality of a statute under the equal pro-
tection clause. Professor Gunther noted that the Warren Court ap-
plied either "scrutiny that was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact"62
or "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact. '6 3
B. The Burger Court's Decisions
The appointment of Warren Burger as Chief Justice came at a
time when a variety of factors pressured the Supreme Court to
change its approach to equal protection cases. First, the Warren
Court's "fundamental interest" doctrine had been harshly criti-
55. Throughout the Warren era, only one statute was struck down by the Supreme
Court when "minimal scrutiny" was invoked. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), ouer-
ruled, City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). Although the Court purported to
apply the minimum rationality standard in Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-11 (1966)
(striking down New Jersey statute requiring only unsuccessful criminal appellants who re-
ceived prison sentences to repay the costs of transcripts used in pursuing their appeals) the
actual method of analysis employed was far more rigorous than the "traditional test of ra-
tionality." Id. at 311 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
57. An underinclusive statute is one in which "[a]ll who are included in the class [cre-
ated by the law] are tainted with the mischief [that the legislature sought to affect], but
there are others also tainted whom the classification does not include." Tussman & ten-
Broek, supra note 27, at 348. An overinclusive law "imposes a burden upon a wider range of
individuals than are included in the class of those tainted with the mischief at which the law
aims." Id. at 351.
58. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
59. See text accompanying notes 27-49 supra.
60. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
61. The analytic weaknesses of the reasonable classification doctrine are discussed in
notes 292-307 and accompanying text infra.
62. Gunther, supra note 4, at 8.
63. Id.
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cized.64 Second, popular awareness of discrimination against
groups other than those defined by race had increased, 5 causing
increased demands for judicial protection. Third, the greater avail-
ability of legal counsel for the disadvantaged"6 coincided with, and
perhaps triggered, the development of new rationales for judicial
intervention on their behalf.6 7
The explosion of equal protection decisions which had com-
menced during the tenure of Earl Warren continued unabated dur-
ing the first decade of the Burger Court.6 8 But the expansion of the
suspect classification and fundamental interest doctrines, begun in
the activist days of the Warren Court, slowed nearly to a halt. 9
Instead, the uneven development of judicial protection for a vari-
ety of groups and interests emerged through a number of "inter-
mediate" approaches to equal protection cases.7°
1. Suspect Classifications
The list of classifications given strict judicial scrutiny did seem
to gain one addition at the beginning of the decade. Alienage, a
characteristic that had provoked heightened judicial scrutiny even
before the Warren Court,7 1 was formally given suspect classifica-
tion status in Graham v. Richardson.2 In that case, the Court
struck down two state laws denying welfare benefits to all but a
few resident aliens. 8 Later cases, however, have made it clear that
64. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 86 (1970).
65. See, e.g., N. GLAZER & D. MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT (2d ed. 1970); G.
GREER, THE FEMALE EUNUCH (1971).
66. Many of the major equal protection suits of the past decade have been brought by
publicly financed legal counsel. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 620-21 (1969).
67. Gunther, supra note 4, at 9 n.41.
68. See Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HAhv. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1977).
69. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 148-49 (1980).
70. On the changing environment confronting the Burger Court, see Mishkin, Equal-
ity, 43 LAW & CONIEMP. PROn. 51, 63-64 (1980).
71. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (striking down a state law for-
bidding the ownership of agricultural land by aliens ineligible for citizenship); Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (striking down a state law barring employers from employing more
than twenty percent aliens).
72. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
73. In one of the two companion cases, the statute did allow aliens who had resided in
the United States for more than fifteen years to collect benefits. Id.
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alienage enjoys only quasi-suspect status;7 congressional classifica-
tions based on alienage75 and state-enacted classifications disquali-
fying aliens from activities involving a broadly defined "right to
govern"76 satisfy the clause's imperative as long as they pass a re-
laxed "rational relationship" test. 7
Two other developments affected the original "suspect classifi-
cation"-race. First, in two landmark cases,78 the Supreme Court
held that it would not apply strict scrutiny to government actions
having a disparate impact on members of different races unless the
actions were based on an overt or covert racial classification, or
unless the government decisionmaker actually intended to disad-
vantage a racial group.Y In light of recent decisions revealing the
difficulty of satisfying the intent requirement" and apparently ex-
tending it to cases involving fundamental rights," proof of discrim-
inatory intent appears to pose an often "insurmountable 8 2 obsta-
cle to establishing a violation of equal protection.
Second, the Supreme Court has spoken with many voices as to
74. Justice Marshall now cites the alienage cases as examples of "an 'intermediate'
level of scrutiny." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 342 n.3 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976).
76. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding state law barring the certifica-
tion of foreign-born persons as public school teachers unless they are, or have manifested an
intention to become, American citizens); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978) (up-
holding state law barring aliens from the state police because of police "authority to exercise
an almost infinite variety of discretionary powers"). See Note, A Dual Standard for State
Discrimination Against Aliens, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1516 (1979).
77. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978).
78. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
79. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-
66 (1977).
80. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding state's absolute
hiring preference for veterans despite its disparate impact on women). "'Discriminatory
purpose,' however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of conse-
quences. It implies that the decision maker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identi-
fiable group." Id. at 279.
81. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion) (upholding
Mobile's at-large system of electing members of its governing commission, despite its ad-
verse impact on black voters, in the absence of a showing that adoption of the seventy-year-
old system was motivated by a discriminatory purpose).
82. L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 1031. See also Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact
and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36, 49-50
(1977). The significance of the intent requirement is discussed in text accompanying notes
230-36 infra.
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whether or not so-called "benign" racial classifications-those
which primarily disadvantage whites-should be viewed with the
same suspicion as are classifications that harm racial minorities.8 3
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,s4 the Court
was called upon to determine the constitutionality of the admis-
sions program used by the medical school at the University of Cali-
fornia at Davis, which reserved approximately sixteen of the one
hundred places in each class for disadvantaged "'Blacks,' 'Chica-
nos,' 'Asians' and 'American Indians.' "85 Citing the distaste with
which all distinctions based on race have traditionally been re-
garded" as well as the difficulty of evaluating the competing claims
of black Americans and other ethnic groups for preferential treat-
ment,8 7 Justice Powell 8 applied the formulation normally de-
scribed as "strict scrutiny" to the admissions program.8, After re-
jecting a variety of justifications for the University's scheme,90
Justice Powell strayed from the course traditionally followed to in-
validate suspect classifications91 and found that "the attainment of
a diverse student body" was a sufficiently compelling goal to justify
a university's consideration of an applicant's race 2 though not suf-
ficient to justify the particular quota-based admissions system
used by the defendant.93
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun followed an
83. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
84. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In this case, a rejected white applicant argued that the Uni-
versity of California at Davis Medical School admissions program violated the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title VI of the Ciyil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and Stevens concluded that the program
violated Title VI and did not reach the equal protection issue. See id. at 408, 412 (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
85. Id. at 274.
86. Id. at 294.
87. Id. at 295-300.
88. Although Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court, his analysis of the
equal protection question was not joined by any other Justice.
89. Id. at 306-15.
90. Id. at 307-11.
91. See text accompanying notes 28-37 supra.
92. 438 U.S. at 311.
93. Justice Powell concluded that the University had unlawfully discriminated against
Bakke and that the medical school must admit him. Although the race of an individual
applicant could be considered by the admissions program in its attempt to create a diverse
student body, race could not be the determinative factor in excluding any person from con-
sideration for any place in the class. 438 U.S. at 319-20.
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arguably94 different analytic approach to a clearly different conclu-
sion. Finding the classifications disadvantaging the white majority
lacked the "traditional indicia of suspectness" 5 that justifies the
application of strict scrutiny, but fearful that superficially "be-
nign" classifications could be used to stigmatize or stereotype the
minorities they seek to aid," the "Brennan Four" concluded that
"racial classifications designed to further remedial purposes . . .
must serve important governmental objectives and must be sub-
stantially related to achievement of those objectives."97 The four
Justices measured the admissions scheme against the University's
"articulated purpose of remedying the effects of past societal dis-
crimination"98 and, after determining that the admissions system
did not operate to stigmatize the minority students the University
intended to benefit,99 pronounced it entirely constitutional. 100
In a case dealing with related issues, Fullilove v. Klutznick,1'0
the Court upheld the constitutionality of a provision of the Public
Works Employment Act of 197712 that required states or localities
to use at least ten percent of federal grants earmarked for the con-
struction of public works projects to buy services and supplies
from "minority business enterprises" owned, at least in part, by
citizens "who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians,
Eskimos, and Aleuts." In an opinion joined by Justice White and
Justice Powell,10 Chief Justice Burger declared that remedying
"the effects of prior discrimination which had impaired or fore-
closed access by minority businesses to public contracting opportu-
94. But see Karst & Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine,
14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 7, 22 (1979). "Can anyone seriously argue that Justice Powell or
the Justices of the Brennan group would have voted differently if each had been required to
decide within the framework of the other's standard of review?" Id.
95. 438 U.S. at 357 (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
28 (1973)). The Supreme Court's indicia of suspectness are discussed in text accompanying
notes 248-52 infra.
96. 438 U.S. at 360-62.
97. Id. at 359, quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (quoting Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S, 190, 197 (1976)). This formulation, the standard most often referred to as
"intermediate scrutiny," is discussed in notes 404-08 & 426-33 and accompanying text infra.
98. 438 U.S. at 362. The technique of examining only a state's articulated purpose(s) is
discussed in text accompanying notes 417-22 infra.
99. Id. at 373-76.
100. Id. at 379.
101. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701, 6705-08, 6710 (1976 ed., Supp II 1979).
103. Justice Powell also wrote a concurring opinion. 448 U.S. at 495.
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nities" was an objective within Congress' broad powers under the
spending and commerce clauses as well as under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment.104 The Chief Justice then found that the
ten percent set-aside was a permissible means of achieving that ob-
jective, despite the possibility of its underinclusiveness,0 5 because
Congress was to be given "necessary latitude to try new techniques
such as the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria to accomplish
remedial objectives. "10
Perhaps because of the criticism leveled at the various stan-
dards of review used in Bakke,° Chief Justice Burger's opinion
concluded with an attempt to avoid the choice of a "scrutiny":
Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must neces-
sarily receive a most searching examination to make sure that it
does not conflict with constitutional guarantees. This case is one
which requires, and which has received, that kind of examination.
This opinion does not adopt, either expressly or implicitly, the
formulas of analysis articulated in such cases as University of
California Regents v. Bakke .... However, our analysis demon-
strates that the MBE provision would survive judicial review
under either "test" articulated in the several Bakke opinions.108
Citing the need "to articulate judicial standards of review in
conventional terms," 109 Justice Powell concurred. He concluded
that the set-aside provision satisfied the "strict" standards set
forth in his opinion in Bakke because Congress had made adequate
findings of discrimination1 and because the set-aside remedy was
"a reasonably necessary means of furthering the compelling gov-
ernmental interest in redressing the discrimination that affects mi-
nority contractors." '
In an opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, Jus-
tice Marshall concurred in the judgment. Applying the same "in-
104. Id. at 473.
105. Because the plaintiffs had mounted only a facial challenge to the provision, the
Chief Justice discounted the possibility that the statute was overinclusive, citing a provision
allowing the Secretary to waive the ten percent requirement and to exclude minority busi-
nesses that attempt to exploit the program "by charging an unreasonable price ... not
attributable to the present effects of past discrimination." Id. 488.
106. Id. at 490.
107. See note 94 supra.
108. 448 U.S. at 491 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 515.
111. Id.
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termediate" approach the "Brennan Four" had applied in Bakke,
the concurring Justices examined "Congress' articulated purpose
for enacting the set-aside provision [which] was to remedy the pre-
sent effects of past racial discrimination. '112 They found that the
set-aside provision did not stigmatize minorities and was "substan-
tially related to the achievement of "the statute's remedial
purpose."'113
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, rejected the con-
tention that Congress has broad powers to use race-conscious
means to remedy the effects of past racial discrimination. Appar-
ently viewing Congress' remedial authority as co-extensive with
that of a court, Justice Stewart concluded that because there was
"no evidence that Congress ha[d] in the past engaged in racial dis-
crimination in its disbursement of federal contracting funds"' 4
and because the provision "may have been enacted to compensate
for the effects of social, educational, and economic 'disadvan-
tage,' ""15 the provision was both impermissibly overinclusive and
directed toward achieving impermissible objectives.
In a separate dissent,"' Justice Stevens conceded Congress'
broad authority to use race-conscious remedies to cure the effects
of past discrimination but argued that the "slapdash statute" was
poorly suited to providing relief either for the broad class of per-
sons harmed by racial discrimination or for the narrow group of
minority contractors that had suffered from racism in the building
industry.1 7 Because in his view, the equal protection clause "im-
pose[s] a special obligation to scrutinize any governmental deci-
sionmaking process" which draws racial distinctions or discrimi-
nates against non-citizens, Justice Stevens examined the
deliberations leading to the passage of the provision and concluded
on the basis of the "perfunctory consideration" revealed in the leg-
islative history that Congress had failed to demonstrate that "its
unique statutory preference is justified by a relevant characteristic
that is shared by the members of the preferred class.""' 8 In effect,
Justice Stevens remanded the provision to Congress with- direc-
112. Id. at 520 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 528 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 529 (footnote omitted).
116. Id. at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 539-40.
118. Id. at 554.
[Vol. 8:777
INTERMEDIATE EQUAL PROTECTION
tions to try again."'
2. Less-than-suspect Classifications
Except for the partial elevation of alienage to suspect status,
the Supreme Court has refused to apply strict scrutiny to classifi-
cations adversely affecting other groups.120 Yet the Court has re-
sponded differently to each, giving women and illegitimate chil-
dren more protection than, for example, the poor and the aged.1 21
a. Gender-based Classifications
Before the 1970's, the Supreme Court, applying minimal scru-
tiny, consistently upheld gender-based classifications that disad-
vantaged women.122 In two of the better-known cases, the Court
upheld laws prohibiting women from practicing law 2 and from
working as bartenders,2 accepting without hesitation the states'
proffered objective of preserving the established social order.
The Court's very deferential treatment of gender discrimina-
tion ended with its 1971 decision in Reed v. Reed.1 25 Although the
Court purported to use a "rational relationship" standard ex-
humed from a 1920 decision,1 26 its condemnation of an Idaho pro-
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973) (sex-based classifications). See also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (clas-
sification based on illegitimate percentage); Massachusetts Retirement Bd. v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307 (1976) (age-based classification); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973) (wealth-based classification).
121. The logic of the Court's treatment of these groups is discussed in notes 327-45
and accompanying text infra.
122. See L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 1060. Although most statutes disadvantaging men
were also upheld, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding state
minimum wage law for women), some Lochner-era decisions did strike down social legisla-
tion geared exclusively to helping women, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525
(1923).
123. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
124. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding statute which denied bartend-
ing licenses to all women except the wife or daughter of a bar owner and limited these
licenses to working on the family premises).
125. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
126. "The Equal Protection Clause does, however, deny to States the power to legis-
late that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different clas-
ses on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification
'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike.' "Id. at 75-76 (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Vir-
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bate law preferring men over "equally entitled" women as adminis-
trators of decedents' estates can be explained only on the basis of
heightened scrutiny provoked by judicial disapproval of sex
discrimination. 12 7
In 1973, gender classifications fell one vote short of obtaining
suspect status when in Frontiero v. Richardson, M the Court struck
down federal statutes which granted the wife of a male member of
the armed services dependency benefits but denied those benefits
to a spouse of a female member of the military unless he could
prove dependence upon his wife for one-half his support. But for
the Court's reluctance to "enact" judicially the proposed Equal
Rights Amendment,1 29 sex-based classifications could quite possi-
bly have been held to the strict scrutiny standard.
In the wake of Frontiero, the Supreme Court evolved an inter-
mediate standard in gender discrimination cases, requiring that
the classification'30 in question "serve important governmental
objectives and. . . be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives."' s The Court's analysis has focused on the determina-
ginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). See text accompanying notes 268-86 infra.
127. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981) (plurality opinion);
Gunther, supra note 4, at 34. See also Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 165.
128. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas, Marshall and
White, found that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alien-
age, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny." Id. at 688. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment, finding that the
legislation constituted "an invidious discrimination" like that condemned in Reed. Id. at 691
(construing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
129. Justice Powell issued an opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun, in which, referring to the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, he wrote that "[ilt
seems to me that this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major political decision
which is currently in process of resolution does not reflect appropriate respect for duly pre-
scribed legislative processes." Id. at 692. (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
130. InPersonnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), the Supreme Court held that
the rule announced in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (applying minimal scrutiny
to government actions having a disparate racial impact on the absence of a racial classifica-
tion or a showing of discriminatory intent), applied to government actions having a dispa-
rate impact on men and women. See note 80 supra. See also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974) (upholding exclusion of pregnancy benefits from state employment disability pro-
gram on ground that it did not discriminate against women).
131. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Re-
cently, some of the Justices have hinted that they might prefer a return to a formulation
similar to that articulated in Reed, turning on whether the gender classification "realisti-
cally reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances."
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 101 S. Ct. 1200, 1204 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger,
C.J., Stewart & Powell, JJ.). See also Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2658-59 (1981).
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tion and evaluation of the governmental decisionmaker's actual
rhotive for discrimination based on gender.13 2 It has repeatedly
struck down legislation based on "archaic and overbroad general-
izations"133 about the status of women and has consistently re-
jected "administrative convenience" as a justification for rules
summarily discriminating between the sexes with respect to the el-
igibility for a government benefit. 34 With two rather unsettling ex-
ceptions 35 in the past five years, only a clear showing, based on the
Rostker is discussed in note 135 infra.
132. See L. TRmE, supra note 47, § 16-25.
133. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
134. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980). See also
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 219 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
135. First, in Michael M. v. Superior Court, 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981), the Court, in a
plurality opinion, upheld California's statutory rape statute, which makes it a felony for
males over the age of eighteen to engage in sexual intercourse "with a female not the wife of
the perpetrator," who is under the age of eighteen. Although the statute did not punish a
minor female for having sex with an adult male, a majority of the Court found that the law
was "sufficiently related" to California's stated objective of reducing teenage pregnancy "to
pass constitutional muster." Id. at 1206 (plurality opinion). See also id. at 1211-13 (Black-
mun, J., concurring in the judgment).
The Court's decision in Michael M. is particularly unsettling for two reasons: First, in
upholding the statute, despite the fact that it punished only males, the Court ignored the
previously articulated requirement that a gender-based classification be substantially re-
lated to the legislature's objective. See id. at 1215-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 1218-
20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Second, the Court accepted the prevention of teenage pregnancy
as the statute's objective despite the fact that "in deciding Michael M... . . the California
Supreme Court decided for the first time in the 130-year history of the statute, that preg-
nancy prevention had become one of the purposes of the statute." Id. at 1217-18 n.10 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
Second, in Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S.Ct. 2646 (1981) (6-3 decision), the Court upheld a
provision of the Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. §, 453. The Act empowers the
President to require "every male citizen" and male resident alien between the ages of eigh-
teen and twenty-six "to register with the Selective Service in order to provide a pool of
possible inductees in the event that a military draft is resumed. After citing "the imposing
number of cases from this Court ... suggest[ing] that judicial deference to [the] congres-
sional exercise of authority is at its apogee when legislative action under the congressional
authority to raise and support armies [U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14]... is challenged,"
101 S.Ct. at 2654, the Court examined the legislative history of the section and concluded
that, unlike other statutes disadvantaging women, "the decision to exempt women from re-
gistration was not the 'accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about wo-
men.'" Id. at 2656 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977)).
The Court accepted without question the statutory restrictions on the participation of
women in combat, 101 S.Ct. 2657-58, and concluded in the face of substantial evidence to
the contrary, that "the purpose of registration was to prepare for a draft of combat troops."
Id. at 2658. See id. at 2668-71 (Marshall, J., dissenting). What is most troubling about the
decision is the Court's tautological conclusion that "[t]he exemption of women from regis-
tration is not only sufficiently but closely related to Congress' purpose in authorizing regis-
tration," id. at 2658, which the Court had found to be the development of an all-male pool
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language of a statute and its legislative history,136 that a gender-
based classification was actually intended "to compensate [Wo-
men] for past [economic] discrimination" I3 has convinced the
Court to uphold such a classification.
Ironically, most of the gender-based classifications passed
upon by the Supreme Court have, at least superficially, disadvan-
taged men, not women.138 Unlike race discrimination, however, sex
discrimination is characterized by an attitude of" 'romantic pater-
nalism' which, in practical effect, put[s] women not on a pedestal,
but in a cage."'' 3 9 Because the Court has perceived a danger that
legislation "favoring" women may sometimes serve to perpetuate
their previously isolated role outside the mainstream of economic
and political activity, it has measured classifications disadvantag-
ing either sex against the same "intermediate" standard. °
b. Classifications Related to Illegitimate Parentage
The Supreme Court has used a variety of techniques to ana-
lyze disparities in the legal status of unwed fathers and mothers. In
one instance the Court struck down as a denial of due process a
statute found to presume conclusively that all unwed fathers are
unfit to have custody of their children, while granting all other nat-
ural parents a hearing on the issue of fitness. Four Justices con-
cluded that the law also constituted a denial of equal protection.
of potential combat troops.
136. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 318-19 (1977).
137. Id. at 318. See also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1979) (defining one condition
for finding compensatory purpose as "whether women had in fact been significantly discrim-
inated against in the sphere to which the statute applied a sex-based classification").
138. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down an Oklahoma statute
allowing women to drink alcoholic beverages upon reaching the age of eighteen, but barring
men from doing so until reaching the age of twenty-one. See also Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313 (1977). In other cases the Court has been split on whether the classification in
question disadvantaged men or women. E.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 206-09
(1977) (viewing the challenged statute as discriminating against women); id. at 223 (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment) (viewing the statute as discriminating against men).
139. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion).
140. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977). There is some reason to believe
that the Court has begun to retreat from the principle that classifications burdening men
must satisfy the standard articulated in Craig v. Boren. In his plurality opinion in Michael
M. v. Superior Court, 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981), Justice Rehnquist stated: "[W]e find nothing
to suggest that men, because of past discrimination or peculiar disadvantages, are in need of
the special solicitude of the courts." Id. at 1207-08.
141. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Justice White wrote the opinion for the
Court, joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall, and joined in part by Justice
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Perhaps due to criticism of the use of the irrebuttable presumption
approach, 14 2 in later cases the Court used a more conventional
equal protection analysis focusing on whether or not the statutory
scheme or issue provided procedures by which an unwed father
could gain legal status equal to that automatically given to an un-
wed mother.14
3
The availability of legal proceedings in which an illegitimate
child or her natural parents can establish parentage has also deter-
mined the outcome of recent Supreme Court cases analyzing legis-
lation that discriminates on the basis of illegitimate parentage.1
4 4
Although heightened judicial scrutiny of such statutes originated
before the Burger era,145 the level of scrutiny to be applied to clas-
sifications based upon illegtimacy has been determined only within
the last five years. The Court, through a comparison of the treat-
ment received by illegitimate children with that received by blacks,
chose a level of scrutiny that is neither strict nor "toothless, ' 46
but intermediate; it required that such classifications be "substan-
tially related to permissible state interests. 1 47
The Court has rejected the constitutional validity of a state's
proffered purpose of discouraging "immoral" activity1 48 and has re-
Douglas, who did not join the Court's discussion of the equal protection clause. Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun dissented. Id. at 659.
142. See text accompanying notes 434-38 infra.
143. Compare Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (striking down a section of
New York Domestic Relations Law which permitted an unwed mother, but not an unwed
father, to block her child's adoption) with Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979)(Powell,
J., concurring in the judgment)(upholding a Georgia law denying father of illegitimate son,
whom the father could have legitimated by court petition, recovery for the son's wrongful
death, while allowing recovery by child's mother or by legitimating father if the mother was
deceased). Although the plurality in Parham found that the statute did not discriminate on
the basis of either sex or illegitimacy, it distinguished Caban on the ground that the father
in that suit lacked a means of legitimating his child. Id. at 356 n.9.
144. See J. ELY, supra note 69, at 164 n.93.
145. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (striking down a statute barring recov-
ery by illegitimate child for wrongful death of parent); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (striking down same statute when used to bar parent's recovery for
wrongful death of illegitimate child).
146. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506-10 (1976) (upholding a survivors' benefits
provision of the Social Security Act that presumed dependency of all children except those
illegitimate children who were ineligible to inherit under state law and who had neither
been legally acknowledged by their father nor determined by a court to be the child of the
decedent).
147. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978). See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767-
72 (1977).
148. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). See also New
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quired that the disadvantages imposed by the state on unwed par-
ents and illegitimate children be closely related to easing the ad-
ministrative burden of determining the right to government
benefits,149 the right of inheritance,150 or the right to sue for wrong-
ful death.151 Because of the problems of proof which often arise in
those contexts, the Court has upheld classifications disadvantaging
on the basis of illegitimacy if the father, during his lifetime, had an
opportunity to acknowledge his child 52 or if the surviving party
has the opportunity to establish parentage.153
c. The Court and the Poor
Judicial protection for the poor predates the Warren Court. In
Edwards v. California,'" a decision as remarkable for the constitu-
tional basis of its holding as for the scope of its language, the Su-
preme Court struck down a statute forbidding the importation of a
nonresident indigent into California as a violation of the commerce
clause. In a concurrence resting on equal protection grounds, Jus-
tice Jackson wrote that "a man's mere property status, without
more, cannot be used by a state to test, qualify, or limit his rights
as a citizen of the United States. . . . The mere state of being
without funds is a neutral fact-constitutionally an irrelevance,
like race, creed, or color."1 55
During Earl Warren's tenure as Chief Justice, the "fundamen-
Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 620 (1973).
149. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
150. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
151. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1967).
152. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
153. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). But see Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978)
(upholding statute barring intestate inheritance from father unless child has been legally
declared father's during father's lifetime); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (striking
down state law barring illegitimate children from inheriting from their fathers by intestate
inheritance); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (upholding state law denying illegiti-
mate children, who had been acknowledged, the right to inherit equally from the estate of a
father who died intestate). These decisions seem to be irreconcilable. See, e.g., 439 U.S. at
277-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 430 U.S. at 776 n.17. If the Court really intends to require
a substantial relationship between the goal of facilitating a quick and accurate determina-
tion of survivor's rights and an illegitmacy based classification, then one must agree with
Justice Brennan's conclusion that the availability of any "less drastic means" of determining
a survivor's rights should condemn any statute disadvantaging illegitimate survivors. 439
U.S. at 278-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
155. Id. at 184-85 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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tal interest" doctrine 156 served as a major vehicle for condemning
wealth-based classifications. For example, the Court struck down
legislation interfering with an indigent person's rights to vote,157 to
run for office, 58 and to enjoy equal access to the courts. 59 In addi-
tion, the Court declared a "right of interstate travel" in a case
where the legislation in question burdened a welfare recipient's
right to travel.1 0
During the Burger Court era, however, "the retreat from the
once glittering crusade to extend special constitutional protection
to the poor has turned into a rout."1611 Prompted in part by a fear
that extension of greater judicial protection to the poor could
bankrupt the treasury,162 and perhaps in part by the realization
that in a society in which wealth is distributed unequally, every
price discriminates against the poor,"" the Court has pursued
three strategies in rendering the equal protection clause a meager
shelter for the poor.
First, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez,6 the Court denied "suspect classification" status to
wealth.65 Speaking for a five-Justice majority, Justice Powell con-
cluded that "at least where wealth is involved, the equal protection
clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advan-
tages. 166 The majority applied the most minimal of scrutinies in
holding that Texas' local property tax system for financing public
schools, which resulted in substantial inequalities in funding be-
156. See text accompanying notes 38-48 supra.
157. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
158. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
159. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (requiring the state to supply indigent
criminal defendants with counsel to prepare their appeals); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956) (requiring that a state provide indigent criminal defendants with a free transcript for
their appeals). See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that due pro-
cess clause bars state from requiring that indigents who seek a divorce pay fees and costs in
order to have access to its courts).
160. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
161. J. ELY, supra note 69, at 148.
162. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970).
163. Michelman, supra note 50, at 32.
164. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
165. Although the Court indicated that the case did not present an instance of clear-
cut wealth discrimination, id. at 23, it has cited Rodriguez for the proposition set forth in
the text. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
166. 411 U.S. at 23 (footnote omitted). Justices Douglas, Brennan, White and Mar-
shall dissented.
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tween rich and poor districts, rationally served the state's asserted
purpose of preserving local control of schools.167
Second, the Burger Court checked the growth of the list of
"fundamental interests," denying the existence of constitutional
rights to decent shelter,16 8 to more than "some identifiable [mini-
mal] quantum of education," 169 or to a publicly financed abor-
tion,170 even if medically necessaiy.17 1 In addition, the Court has
arrested development of the previously established right of equal
access to the courts17 2 by upholding state rules requiring the pay-
ment of filing fees for commencing a bankruptcy proceeding,173 and
the right to pursue an administrative appeal of the denial of wel-
fare benefits, 4 for no more compelling justification than that the
rules added money to the states' coffers. In addition, the Court has
upheld a state's money-saving practice of denying indigent defen-
dants appointed counsel for nonmandatory appellate proceed-
ings.17 5 Only the right to travel interstate 176 and some rights associ-
ated with familial privacy 77 have provided the basis for any
expansion in substantive protection for the poor under the equal
protection clause.
Finally, the Supreme Court has reserved its most deferential
scrutiny for the type of legislation that most often affects the poor.
167. Id. at 55. As Justice White pointed out in his dissent, under Texas' school financ-
ing system, poorer districts became more dependent on state and federal revenues, thereby
reducing local control over the schools. Id. at 63 (White, J., joined by Douglas & Brennan,
JJ., dissenting).
168. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73 (1972).
169. In San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), Justice Pow-
ell assumed, without deciding, that some education may be "a constitutionally protected
prerequisite to the meaningful exercise" of the right of free speech and the right to vote. Id.
at 36-37.
170. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1977) (upholding restriction limiting expen-
diture of Medicaid funds to childbirth, not abortion).
171. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
172. See note 159 supra.
173. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
174. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
175. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
176. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (striking down Ari-
zona's twelve-month residence requirement for the provision of nonemergency medical ser-
vices to the indigent).
177. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 404 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring) (Wis-
consin law requiring a divorced parent without custody of his child, but with child support
obligations, to obtain court permission before remarrying constituted "invidious" discrimi-
nation against the poor).
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In Dandridge v. Williams,178 the Court upheld a flat limitation on
the amount of Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits
payable to a family regardless of its size, ruling that:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifica-
tions made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some
"reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply be-
cause the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety or
because in practice it results in some inequality. 179
The Burger Court has upheld other classifications disadvantaging
groups of poor persons, in spite of credible evidence that the dis-
tinctions in question were carelessly or arbitrarily drawn, based on
Dandridge's instruction to defer to the legislature.180
Dandridge notwithstanding, not all social welfare legislation
has received such light-handed treatment by the Supreme Court.
In two 1973 cases, the Court struck down provisions of the Food
Stamp Act that appeared, based on their legislative history, to
have been enacted with the intent to exclude "'hippies' and 'hip-
pie communes" "" and "'college students [who are] children of
wealthy parents' 11 8 2 from eligibility. Finding that "a bare congres-
sional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot consti-
tute a legitimate governmental interest,"18 the Court in United
States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, struck down the
anti-hippie commune provision, reasoning that the prohibition
against providing benefits to households with unrelated occupants
was not a rational device to achieve the government's only legiti-
mate objective, that of preventing benefits fraud. In United States
Department of Agriculture v. Murry, the Court found that the
statute's "irrebuttable presumption"'"M that all persons over eigh-
teen years old listed as dependents on tax returns in the previous
178. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
179. Id. at 485 (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
180. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972) (upholding state social
welfare program which paid a lower percentage of recognized standard of "need" to AFDC
recipients than to those who received benefits because they were elderly, blind or disabled).
181. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
182. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 512-13 (1973).
183. 413 U.S. at 534 (emphasis in original). See also James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128,
140-42 (1972) (striking down as discriminatory and irrational a Kansas statute denying indi-
gent defendants, against whom the state had obtained a recoupment judgment for the cost
of legal fees, certain exemptions provided for all other judgment debtors).
184. 413 U.S. at 514.
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year were not "needy," was "often contrary to fact" and "lack[ed]
critical ingredients of due process.118 5 Two Justices concurred on
equal protection grounds. 18
d. The Aged
The last of the major demands by an identifiable interest
group for heightened judicial protection under the equal protection
clause came in a case challenging Massachusetts' requirement that
state police officers retire upon reaching the age of fifty. In Massa-
chusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,e7 the Supreme Court re-
jected the plaintiff's claim that age-based classifications were con-
stitutionally "suspect," and applied a "rational-basis standard...
reflecting the Court's awareness that the drawing of lines that cre-
ate distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable
one." 188 The Court found that the mandatory retirement rule was
rationally related to the Commonwealth's objective of maintaining
a fit police force despite the fact that every police officer was al-
ready required to take an annual physical. 189 In a 1979 case, the
Court made still clearer its determination that, to challenge an
age-based discrimination successfully, a plaintiff "must convince
the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is ap-
parently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the
governmental decisionmaker."9 0
Whether or not the varying degrees of deference shown to leg-
islative classifications adversely affecting particular groups is expli-
cable by the Burger Court by reference to any coherent vision of
the purpose of the equal protection clause is discussed in the next
two parts of this article.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 514-15 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Marshall's concurrence, which combines elements of due process and equal protection,
is quoted in note 330 infra.
187. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
188. Id. at 314.
189. Id. at 325-26 (Marshall, J., dissenting). On the necessity for requiring individual-
ized determinations of competence where age-based classifications prevent the aged from
engaging in fundamental activities, and where administrative costs are not appreciably in-
creased, see L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 1080-81.
190. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979) (upholding compulsory retirement of
Foreign Service officers at age sixty).
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II. The Five "Mediating Principles"
"Every law enacted, unless it applies to all persons at all times and
in all places, inevitably imposes sanctions upon some and declines
to impose the same sanctions on others."191
A. Some Preliminary Considerations
Laws, by their nature, classify persons according to the pres-
ence or absence of one or more characteristics19 2 and, by virtue of
the classifications, destine them for different treatment. Often a
statute makes a particular attribute very significant; its existence
or absence may condemn two otherwise identical persons to dra-
matically different fates.19 As Justice Rehnquist has observed,
however, "[a]ll legislation involves the drawing of lines, and the
drawing of lines necessarily results in particular individuals who
are disadvantaged by the line drawn being virtually indistinguish-
able for many purposes from those individuals who benefit from
the legislative classification.' 94 In the face of this jurisprudential
fact of life stands the Fourteenth Amendment, enjoining the gov-
ernment from denying any person "the equal protection of the
laws." Owen Fiss described the problem: "[R]ecognition of the in-
evitability and indeed the justice of some line-drawing makes the
central task of equal protection theory one of determining which
lines or distinctions are permissible.' ' 9 5 As the length, volume and
divisiveness of the Supreme Court's equal protection opinions indi-
cate,196 the task has been far from simple.
To satisfy the popular conception of the role of the courts, any
attempt to derive a mediating principle that gives meaning to the
191. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 785 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
192. As used in this discussion, the words "characteristic" and "attribute" encompass
engaging in, or having engaged in, a particular activity.
193. The Jim-Crow laws are perhaps the best example.
194. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 660 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
195. Fiss, supra note 20, at 108.
196. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (in
which the Justices' five opinions covered 137 pages); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1977) (in which the Justices issued six opinions, each with a different rationale, in an eight-
to-one decision). The Supreme Court has not limited its proliferation of opinions to equal
protection decisions. See Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Foreword: Freedom of Ex-
pression in the Burger Court, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1, 24-26 (1980) (chastising the Justices for
"their insistence upon individual opinions in first amendment cases"). See also Note, Plu-
rality Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1127 (1981).
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bare words of the equal protection clause must satisfy two condi-
tions: It must be susceptible of a formulation consistent with the
text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment, 19 7 and it must
contain a rationale for judicial reversal of judgments made by dem-
ocratically elected officials or their delegates. 198
1. Intent of the Draftsmen
An analysis of the proceedings leading to the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment is beyond the scope of this essay. Most of
the scholars who have analyzed its passage reached an unsurprising
conclusion: that at a minimum the Amendment was intended to
ensure that the post-bellum Civil Rights Acts, which banned many
forms of racial discrimination, were constitutional.19' Beyond this,
the extent of the protection to be afforded by the provision's
sweeping language2 0 was deliberately left unclear.2 01 As Professor
Ely described it, "the content of the Equal Protection Clause...
will not be found anywhere in its terms or in the ruminations of its
writers. '20 2 But because "[t]he original understanding forms the
starting link in the chain of continuity which is a source of the
Court's authority,"20 s the temptation to liken, or to distinguish, the
plight of any person disadvantaged by a government action to, or
from, the condition of blacks before the Civil War is often over-
whelming.204 But the harms visited upon blacks in ante-bellum
America were complex and hence susceptible to a variety of de-
scriptions. Blacks were enslaved, impoverished, treated irrationally
and unequally, disenfranchised, and generally victimized by
prejudice. 05 Once the equal protection clause is interpreted as of-
fering protection to groups other than blacks, the question re-
197. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 780-81 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
198. See generally J. ELY, supra note 69.
199. See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 14, at 59-61.
200. On the difference in language between the Fourteenth Amendment and the other
Civil War Amendments, see note 14 supra and J. ELY, supra note 69, at 30.
201. Bickel, supra note 14, at 59-63. See J. ELY, supra note 69, at 30 n.70. See also
Developments, supra note 5, at 1068-69.
202. J. ELY, supra note 69, at 32. See also Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204 (1980).
203. Bickel, supra note 14, at 4-5.
204. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677. 684-88 (1973). See also Fiss, supra note 20, at 147-48.
205. See K. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION (1956).
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mains: Which of these evils does the clause condemn? Requiring
allegiance to the "original understanding" offers little assistance to
the search for the meaning of equal protection.
2. The Proper Role of the Judiciary
Professor Ely has characterized the United States as "a society
[that] from the beginning, and now almost instinctively, [has] ac-
cepted the notion that a representative democracy must be our
form of government. '"206 Given these democratic aspirations, it is
not surprising that much of "the original Constitution is devoted
almost entirely to structure '20 7 and to providing a framework
through which the popular will can be determined-and once de-
termined, exercised-while minimizing the risk of overcentralized
power that the forefathers saw as the precondition for tyranny.20 8
But portions of the original constitution were obviously intended
to place limits on the power of the people's representatives, regard-
less of the public's desires; 0 9 many of its twenty-six amendments
simply forbid the democratic branches from making laws having
certain proscribed impacts.2 1
The irony of a representative democracy binding itself to an
ancient charter that places substantive limitations on its govern-
ment's power has not gone unnoticed. Professor Tribe has asked
"why a nation that rests legality on the consent of the governed
would choose to constitute its political life in terms of commit-
ments to an original agreement-made by the people, binding on
their children, and deliberately structured so as to be difficult to
change."2" ' The answer is obvious: The Framers saw the need for
limitations on the popular sovereignty. Their Constitution requires
all state and federal elected officials and judges to take an oath "to
support this Constitution, '21 2 even, presumably, when doing so
contradicts the majority's demands.218 Thus, the limitations on
governmental action enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment
and elsewhere in the Constitution are limitations on the authority
206. J. ELY, supra note 69, at 5 (footnote omitted).
207. Id. at 90.
208. See L. TRaw, supra note 47, §§ 2-1 to 2-4.
209. See, e.g., U. S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
210. See, e.g., U. S. CONST. amend. L
211. L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 9.
212. U. S. CONsT. art. VI, § 3.
213. L. TRms, supra note 47, at 9-10.
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of duly elected, or appointed, public officials. The Constitution it-
self is sometimes "counter-majoritarian."
Related to the irony of a deliberately counter-majoritarian
Constitution is the dilemma posed by judicial review: federal
judges enjoy life tenure and for this reason are far less accountable
to the electorate than are most government officials. Charged by
the Constitution with enforcing its limitations on the power of the
other branches,214 the judiciary, and in particular the Supreme
Court, has tremendous power to dismantle the .work of popularly
elected representatives. 15 As Professor Bickel has noted, "the su-
preme autonomy that the Court asserts in many matters of sub-
stantive policy needs justification in a political democracy."21'
That justification, like the justification for a constitution that lim-
its the exercise of popular sovereignty, must derive from a theory
for determining which activities are best left beyond the reach of
the people's representatives and when a particular government ac-
tion is inconsistent with this nation's sense of justice. Thus, an ef-
fort to give meaning to the equal protection clause must be shaped
by an understanding that much of the Constitution exists to in-
struct us on when the democratic process should not be trusted.
That the task of giving meaning to its instructions is partially dele-
gated to judges who are not popularly elected should not bar those
judges from answering the question asked by the Fourteenth
Amendment: Are the limits imposed on a representative democ-
racy by an injunction against denying "equal protection of the
laws" exceeded by the government activity in question? Five par-
tial answers are discussed below.
B. Model One: Protection from Prejudice
1. The Model Described
The equal protection clause is often viewed as a mandate to
the judiciary to prevent individuals from being treated unequally
as a result of a governmental decisionmaker's "prejudiced" motive.
As most recently articulated by John Hart Ely,21  the "protection
214. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
215. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
216. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 86 (1970).
217. J. ELY, supra note 69, at 145-70. Professor Ely's "representation-reinforcing" the-
ory of judicial review actually combines two of the models discussed herein: the protection-
from-prejudice model and the model of equal treatment. The latter portion of Ely's theory
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from prejudice" model posits the legitimacy of most decisions ar-
rived at by democratically elected bodies. According to adherents
of the model, because most government actions that disadvantage
a group have resulted from a legislative process to which the
group's members had sufficient access, most differences in treat-
ment are presumed to be legitimate, and therefore constitutional,
outcomes of the democratic process.
But the presence of prejudice in the minds of decisionmakers
strips the political process of its presumption of legitimacy. Ac-
cording to the proponents of this model, a strong and widely held
bias against a particular group has two distinct but related effects
on the political process.21 First, prejudice often works to exclude
groups from access to decisionmaking authority.2 19 When a disen-
franchised group is disadvantaged, the source of legitimacy in a
democratic society-the consent of the governed-is lacking. Sec-
ond, and perhaps more important now that virtually all but the
young, the mentally deficient220 and aliens can vote, prejudice is
believed to create a malfunction in the democratic process 221 by
causing biased legislators to underestimate, or to desire the nega-
tive effect that a proposed statute has upon a despised group, and
to refuse to bargain with its representatives.222 According to Pro-
fessor Ely:
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust,
when (1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change
to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2)
though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives
beholden to an effective majority are systematically disadvantag-
ing some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal
to recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that
minority the protection afforded other groups by a representative
is discussed in text accompanying notes 336-39 infra.
218. See J. ELY, supra note 69, at 103.
219. See A. BIcKEL, supra note 216, at 85.
220. See Note, Mental Disability and The Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979).
See also Schweiker v. Wilson, 101 S. Ct. 1074 (1981). Because a Social Security Act provi-
sion denying subsistence benefits to individuals institutionalized in public mental institu-
tions does not discriminate against the mentally ill, as a discrete group, the Court expressed
no view as to which standard of review applies to such legislation. Id. at 1081 n.13.
221. Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law,
15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 953, 980 (1978).
222. See Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974).
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system. "3
A statute that contains an explicitly "prejudiced" classification
or that is otherwise clearly intended to disadvantage a despised
minority has two negative qualities. First, prejudiced motivation
robs the legislation of its process-derived legitimacy. Second, the
simple use of the suspect classification or the passage of an obvi-
ously prejudiced law perpetuates the isolation and stigmatization
of the victimized group.2 4 Though a government action that the
protection-from-prejudice model condemns usually has both nega-
tive features, only the former is considered relevant within the
framework of the model.2 25
The protection-from-prejudice model seems to be what the
Supreme Court invokes when it uses the suspect classification doc-
trine to condemn an instance of "invidious discrimination. '226 The
Court's use of the equal protection clause to condemn prejudice
dates back at least to 1880, when, in Strauder v. West Virginia,227
it reversed a conviction by a jury from which blacks had been
barred. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Strong explained the
purpose of adopting the Fourteenth Amendment:
By their manumission and citizenship the colored race be-
came entitled to the equal protection of the laws of the States in
which they resided; and the apprehension that through prejudice
they might be denied that equal protection, that is, that there
might be discrimination against them, was the inducement to be-
stow upon the national government the power to enforce the pro-
vision that no State shall deny to them the equal protection of
the laws.228
A reading of its recent decisions reveals that the Supreme
Court still considers protection from prejudice to be the primary
purpose of the equal protection clause.229 Among the analytic tech-
223. J. ELY, supra note 69, at 103 (emphasis in original).
224. See Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term-Foreword. In Defense of the An-
tidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 11 (1976).
225. See J. ELY, supra note 69, at 160 n.*. The view that the equal protection clause
prohibits government action that "stigmatizes" certain groups is discussed in text accompa-
nying notes 268-86 infra.
226. See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. Rav. 197 (1976). "[W]hat is it
that 'suspect classifications' are suspected of? The suspicion, in that phrase, is suspicion of
prejudice." Id. at 201-02 (emphasis in original).
227. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
228. Id. at 309.
229. See generally Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
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niques used by the Court in several of its recent "intermediate"
equal protection decisions, 23 0 both its sometime focus on the legis-
lature's actual purpose in passing a statute,23 1 and its refusal to
consider legitimate a desire to disadvantage certain groups 2 2 are
consistent with a desire to invalidate only legislation motivated by
prejudice. In addition, its refusal to invalidate actions having a dis-
parate impact on racial minorities in the absence of a showing of
discriminatory intent233 seems to reflect adherence to the anti-
prejudice model. Finally, its reluctance, without "some reason to
infer antipathy," to invalidate "improvident decisions" made by
the legislature is consistent with a belief that the clause bars only
governmental actions stemming from prejudice.23 4
Perhaps the greatest virtue of the protection-from-prejudice
model is its ability to explain the varying levels of justification re-
quired of different legislative classifications. To one of the model's
adherents, the scrutinies constitute an "evidentiary system
through which the Court assesses the probable truthfulness of the
government's explanation of its action. '23 6 Because the model con-
demns a prejudiced motive, and because governmental deci-
sionmakers are rarely so foolish as to assert such purposes in sup-
port of a statute when doing so would condemn the law as
unconstitutional,23 6 the Court has created the scrutinies to serve as
a set of presumptions about a decisionmaker's real motives.
Thus, where the hostility directed toward a group targeted by
a statutory classification is pronounced and the group's identifying
characteristic is irrelevant to the achievement of a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose, the Court is "suspicious '2 7 that the legisla-
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980). But see Michael M. v. Superior Court, 101 S. Ct. 1200
(1981), where the majority notes: "The question for us-and the only question under the
Federal Constitution-is whether the legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, not whether its supporters may have endorsed it for reasons no
longer generally accepted." Id. at 1206.
230. See text accompanying notes 399-453 infra.
231. E.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). But see United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177-78 (1980).
232. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
233. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
234. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
235. Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the
Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEo L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1978).
See also J. ELY, supra note 69, at 147-48.
236. Clark, supra note 221, at 977.
237. This is, as Professor Ely says, le mot juste. J. ELY, supra note 69, at 147-48.
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ture's stated objective is merely a pretext for a prejudiced motive.
To allay its suspicions, the Court requires that a proffered objec-
tive be both compelling and precisely tailored to the classification
in question. Where, as with gender, the characteristic described by
a legislative classification identifies a group that has suffered from
prejudicial treatment but is relevant to a legitimate state pur-
pose,2 38 the model demands that a "substantial" relationship to an
"important" governmental purpose be shown in order to rebut a
weaker presumption of bias.23 9 Finally, the rational relationship
test reflects a judicial presumption that most legislation is not mo-
tivated by prejudice; only a showing of manifest irrationality240 can
convince the Court that prejudice is the motive for a statute that
does not contain an offensive classification.
2. The Model Evaluated
Challenges to the anti-prejudice model can be made at three
levels: the practical, the political, and the philosophical.
Assume for the moment that the determination of what con-
stitutes an unconstitutional motivation can be made by referring to
an unambiguous source within the Constitution. Nevertheless, as-
certaining whether a particular legislative action is the result of a
prejudiced motivation is a very difficult task.241
A legislature is, by definition, a lawmaking body composed of
many representatives. Each lawmaker may vote for a particular
measure for different reasons, or for a variety of reasons. Thus, the
notion of a single legislative purpose is often a fallacy.242 In addi-
tion, few decisions are preceded by open and extensive delibera-
tions that are painstakingly chronicled in legislative histories. Few
legislative histories contain explicit "admissions" of. prejudicial
motives by even a tiny minority of the legislators. Few legislators
238. Cf. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding, against a Title VII
challenge, a state regulation barring the use of women as guards in an unusually violent
maximum security prison for men).
239. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
240. See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivatiqn in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205, 1263 (1970).
241. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 101 S. Ct. 1200, 1204 (1981). "This Court has
long recognized that 'inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous mat-
ter,' and the search for the 'actual' or 'primary' purpose of a statute is likely to be elusive."
Id. at 1204 (citations omitted).
242. See Ely, supra note 240.
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harboring invidious motives would condemn their desired objective
by openly confessing their reasons for acting. 43 As a result, the
process of determining whether or not a decisionmaker acted be-
cause of a prejudicial motivation is generally inferential;244 the
court must reason from the absence of a plausible, nonprejudicial
motive to a conclusion of unconstitutional motivation. 45
The difficult inferential quality of the search for prejudicial
motivation helps to explain the development of the varying levels
of scrutiny. Based upon judicial preconceptions about the likeli-
hood that legislation containing a particular classification was mo-
tivated by prejudice, the scrutinies are burden-shifting devices
which in most cases assign the difficult task of proving an uncon-
stitutional motivation to the disadvantaged party.
The conception of the political process underlying the protec-
tion-from-prejudice model is susceptible to a variety of criticisms.
A noncriticism may be dispensed with first: Some supporters of the
model, as well as its critics, complain that analyzing the legislative
process condemns the judiciary to a more intrusive role than would
an approach focusing solely on the results of legislative deci-
sions;246 that is, by searching for evidence of unconstitutional moti-
vation, the courts must intrude into the political branches' deliber-
ations. If the equal protection clause demands a prejudice-free
legislative process, however, then the commentators' lament is a
justification for, rather than a criticism of, judicial intervention.247
The use of standards of review, in lieu of a case-by-case deter-
mination of whether or not a prejudicial motive contributed to the
adoption of a particular statute, makes the decision to accord a
characteristic "suspect classification" status extremely important.
Thus, the categorization of groups according to the relative likeli-
243. See id. at 1214-15.
244. Much has been written regarding the significance and detection of unconstitu-
tional motivation. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 221; Ely, supra note 240; Simon, supra note
235. To what extent a discriminatory motive must influence a particular decision is also a
question that has provoked considerable attention. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 279 (1979); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of
Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36, 57-59 (1977).
245. See J. ELY, supra note 69, at 139; Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The
Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1052 (1980).
246. See, e.g., Bork, Commentary: The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the
Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695, 698-99; Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry,
15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163, 1165 (1978).
247. See Linde, supra note 226, at 239.
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hood of legislative prejudice against them is an integral part of the
application of the protection-from-prejudice model. The criteria
used for selecting "endangered" groups, like much of the analysis
developed by the model's adherents, have been greatly influenced
by pluralist political theory.
The most frequently cited criteria for determining whether a
group is entitled to heightened judicial protection originated in the
now famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products
Co.,2 4 8 that is, whether the disadvantaged persons constitute a
"discrete and insular minorit[y]," against whom "prejudice" may
tend "seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily relied upon to protect minorities." Evidently, the "polit-
ical process" that Justice Stone had in mind was the coalition
building which is the cornerstone of pluralist political theory:2'9
Because no single interest group possesses sufficient authority to
control all political decisions, members of minorities are protected
from majoritarian oppression by their ability to build coalitions on
a variety of issues, trading their participation in legislative coali-
tions for assurances that future disadvantaging will not occur.
As was discussed earlier,50 prejudice threatens a minority in
two ways: First, it may result in the actual disenfranchisement of
members of the minority, thereby rendering it unable to defend
itself in the political arena. Second, and more common, prejudice
may create a semi-permanent majority composed of a coalition of
interest groups who are willing to overlook their occasionally in-
consistent interests in order to disadvantage a hated or simply mis-
understood minority.251 Given this conception of the democratic
process, it is hardly surprising that proponents of the anti-
prejudice model consistently list as criteria for heightened judicial
scrutiny disenfranchisement, widespread public hostility, and the
prevalence of generalizations favorably comparing the legislative
majority to the disadvantaged group.252 These criteria account for
malfunctions in the process of interest-group coalition building
that is central to the pluralists' idealization of the political system.
248. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
249. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 216, at 37; R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS (1961). See
also Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1191 (1977).
250. See text accompanying notes 218-23 supra.
251. See J. ELY, supra note 69, at 154-57.
252. Id. at 150-60.
[Vol. 8:777
Summer 1981] INTERMEDIATE EQUAL PROTECTION
The model's reliance on pluralist political theory reveals its
limited conception of prejudice and undermines the notion of pro-
cess-derived legitimacy that justifies its usual deference to the po-
litical branches. As many political scientists have pointed out, plu-
ralist theory fails to take into account the inability of some
individuals who share a common set of interests to organize into
effective political interest groups. 53 Because of the incidence of a
variety of transaction costs, the "nongroups'" claims fail to reach
the legislative agenda, and their interests are inadequately pro-
tected from abuse by the legislative majority.2 ' In contending that
the interests of all members of society are taken into account
before a political decision is made, the pluralist theory therefore
fails to consider those interests that, for economic or social reasons,
are not well represented in the political arena.2 55
This critique of pluralism reveals the first great weakness in
most articulations of the protection-from-prejudice model: their
limited conception of prejudice.256 The majority's consistent failure
to consider the common interests of individuals lacking the incen-
tive or the resources to initiate social discourse constitutes an exer-
cise of political power that results in the systematic disadvantaging
of groups such as the poor and the sick that are neither "discrete"
nor truly "insular." The victimization of these groups often stems
not from hostility, but from a lack of public awareness of their de-
mands.5 Though such groups are at the mercy of the political
process,25s most current definitions of prejudice fail to protect
them from disadvantageous governmental decisions.
Moreover, acceptance of a pluralist political vision belies the
conception of a legitimate public purpose that constitutes the anti-
253. P. BACHARACH & M. BARATZ, POWER AND PovERTY. THEORY AND PRACTICE (1970);
R. W. COBB AND C. D. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE DYNAMICS OF
AGENDA-BUILDING (1972); E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SoVEREIGN PEOPLE (1960).
254. See A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); M. OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
255. See authorities cited in note 253 supra.
256. This criticism was elaborated by Judge J. Skelly Wright in Wright, Professor
Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 789 (1971).
257. See Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977). "When the burden of legislation
falls most heavily on a group that is likely to be the subject of the legislature's systematic
neglect, it is natural for judicial scrutiny to be heightened." Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
258. See Wright, supra note 256, at 789.
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prejudice model's justification for most legislatively created ine-
quality.2 5 1 Because all government actions are the result of one co-
alition's triumph over another, the pluralist recognizes that all gov-
ernment actions may also be seen as the deliberate favoring of one
segment of the population over another. Given this characteriza-
tion of the political process, the emptiness of the model's definition
of "prejudice" is revealed; what is subsumed in the concept of
"prejudice" is a set of value judgments about when the government
may or may not treat particular groups or individuals unequally.
Only a judicially supplied definition of "just and unjust dis-
advantaging" can give meaning to the model's concept of
prejudice.6 0
For example, assume that in addition to possessing the power
to sentence burglars to life in prison, 61 the state could also punish
them by compelling them to travel in the back of public buses or
to use separate bathrooms. In this time of increasing concern about
crime, it is also fair to assume that the public feels hostility toward
burglars, and that a majority of the legislature passing such a law
made unflattering generalizations about them. Yet treating bur-
glars as blacks had been treated for a hundred years would not
provoke heightened judicial scrutiny under the equal protection
clause.262 What distinguishes burglars from blacks is not that the
old generalizations about blacks were more inaccurate than are
those about burglars; it is that reference to our own moral constel-
lation, our vision of the right "place" for people possessing particu-
lar characteristics or engaging in particular activities, convinces us
that treating blacks unequally is unjust, while treating burglars un-
equally is just. Thus, contrary to the position taken by the adher-
ents of the protection-from-prejudice model, "prejudice" is not an
intoxicant that distorts the vision of decisionmakers; it is the con-
clusion one draws when an individual has unjustly suffered a harm
or been denied a benefit by the government because that individ-
ual possessed a certain characteristic or engaged in a certain
activity.2 6 3
259. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27, at 350.
260. See Eisenberg, supra note 244, at 147.
261. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Tribe, supra note 229, at 1075.
262. Cf. New York- City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (upholding regu-
lation barring past and present methadone users from employment by transit authority).
263. After all, wasn't it fear of "invidious discrimination" that prompted the Supreme
Court to prevent a burglar from being sterilized? See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
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Once the value judgments underlying a finding of prejudice
are apparent, an alternative, nonevidentiary explanation for the
various levels of scrutiny is inevitable. If a suspect classification
can be upheld based upon a finding that it serves a compelling
state interest in spite of the presence of widespread animosity to-
ward the disadvantaged group,264 strict scrutiny can no longer be
described as a presumption about prejudice; it simply becomes a
vehicle for judicial interest balancing. Divergent results under in-
termediate formulations 265 can be similarly attributed to a judicial
conclusion that sometimes the legislature may disadvantage a par-
ticular group, and sometimes it may not.2 66
Finally, because the Court often treats it as an analytic ap-
proach distinct from the protection-from-prejudice model, 26 7 the
requirement of legislative rationality is analyzed as a separate
model.
The problems with a theory that purports to explain the
Court's equal protection decisions in terms of presumptions about
whether or not particular legislative decisions are motivated by
prejudice are insurmountable. At a practical level, the search for
evidence of a single legislative purpose is inherently unrealistic and
(1942).
See Tribe, supra note 229. "[T]he conclusion that a legislative classification reveals
prejudicial stereotypes must, at bottom, spring from a disagreement with the judgments
that lie behind the stereotype. . . ." Id. at 1075 (emphasis in original).
264. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 490 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White & Powell, JJ.) (dictum); id. at
507 (Powell, J., concurring) (statutory provision requiring that ten percent of contracts on
state and local public works projects financed with federal grants be set aside for "minority
business enterprises" satisfies "strict scrutiny").
Note that Chief Justice Burger's opinion did not spell out the analysis implicit in his
conclusion that the provision satisfied strict scrutiny. See notes 107-08 and accompanying
text supra. In upholding the provision as "a reasonably necessary means of furthering the
compelling governmental interest in redressing the discrimination that affects minority con-
tractors," id. at 515, and in doing so based on a "reasonable congressional finding of dis-
crimination," id. at 503 n.4, Justice Powell shows far greater deference to the legislature
than is normally present in cases wherein strict scrutiny is applied. See The Supreme
Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARv. L. REv. 77, 132-33 (1980).
265. Compare Michael M. v. Superior Court, 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981) with Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268 (1979).
266. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 101 S. Ct. 1200, 1219 n.4 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). See also Cox, Book Review, 94 HARv. L. REv. 700 (1981). In equal protection
cases, "the Court is always deciding whether in its judgment the harm done to the disadvan-
taged class by the legislative classification is disproportionate to the public purposes the
measure is likely to achieve." Id. at 706.
267. E.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
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often fruitless. At a political level, the protection-from-prejudice
model is locked into a set of inaccurate perceptions concerning the
political significance of certain characteristics and the functions of
the democratic process. Most importantly, the model is dependent
upon two concepts, "prejudice" and "legitimate governmental ob-
jective," that are meaningless without reference to a vision of just
and unjust disadvantaging that cannot be derived from the consti-
tutional text.
C. Model II: The Model of Required Rationality
1. The Model Described
The equal protection clause is often described as a prohibition
against government action that "irrationally" or "unreasonably"
disadvantages some segment of the population.26 As such, the
clause is translated into a requirement that the government treat
all "similarly situated" individuals equally, unless distinguishing
among them "rationally" serves a legitimate public purpose.6 9
During the Lochner era,270 the Supreme Court used the re-
quired-rationality model to strike down state tax laws that "arbi-
trarily" taxed some businesses while not taxing others. For exam-
ple, in F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,271 the Supreme Court
held that a Virginia tax statute exempting local corporations that
did no business within the state while including all the income of
local corporations doing business both in and out of the state vio-
lated the equal protection clause. In so doing the Court articulated
one frequently quoted formulation of the rationality requirement:
"[T]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike. '272
During the period between the conclusion of the Lochner era
and the end of the Warren Court, the Court considered the re-
quirement of legislative rationality to be satisfied so long as it
could find that the legislature had a "conceivable basis" for believ-
268. E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 489 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
269. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
270. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
271. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
272. Id. at 415.
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ing that the classification rationally served a legitimate state inter-
est.27 s Although the Burger Court has continued to apply this
"minimal scrutiny" in the majority of nonsuspect classification
cases, 7 4 it has stiffened the requirement of legislative rationality in
others, striking down several statutes for failing to serve rationally
any legitimate governmental objective.2
2. The Model Evaluated
Like the protection-from-prejudice model, the requirement of
legislative rationality has analytic difficulties which hamper its ap-
plication, as well as an open-endedness that deprives it of meaning.
Under the required-rationality model, the government's burden of
justifying its unequal treatment of two groups is satisfied by a
showing that the groups are not "similarly situated."' 76 Without
some externally supplied notion of exactly where all individuals
are situated, however, a court applying this formulation must ask,
"situated with respect to what?" According to Tussman and ten-
Broek, "[t]he inescapable answer is that we must look beyond the
classification to the purpose of the law. 2 77 Thus, the requirement
273. See text accompanying notes 52-61 supra.
274. E.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976).
Although the Court has continued to uphold most legislative classifications to which it
has applied the rationality requirement, its willingness to accept a statute's stated objective,
and to assume that the legislature acted rationally in using a classification to achieve it, has
varied markedly from case to case. A recent example is quite dramatic. In United States
R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980), the Court, per Justice Rehnquist, de-
clared that Congress had intended to draw the distinction it had made in a statute eliminat-
ing "windfall" retirement benefits for certain former railroad employees and that Congress
had not acted irrationally in attempting to achieve its objective through the classification it
used. Id. at 176-79. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. Id. at 182.
Six weeks later, in his opinion for the Court in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
101 S. Ct. 715 (1981), Justice Brennan engaged in a considerably more extended discussion
of the rationality of a Minnesota statute that banned the sale of milk in plastic nonreturn-
able containers. Rather than accept as given that the legislature's stated purpose was its
actual purpose and that Congress had acted rationally, the Court in Clover Leaf, as it had
done in Fritz, engaged in a thorough examination of the legislative history to buttress its
conclusion that the distinction between plastic and nonplastic containers was rationally re-
lated to the statute's actual purpose. Id. at 723 n.7, 724-27. For a discussion of the "numer-
ous formulations" of the rational-basis test applied by the Burger Court see Schweiker v.
Wilson, 101 S. Ct. 1074, 1087 n.4 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
275. E.g., United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
276. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 2658-59 (1981); Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
277. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27, at 346. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior
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that the government treat equally those "similarly situated" must
be viewed simply as a demand that the classification in question
bear some logical relationship to the purpose of the statute.278
Even if a definition of "legitimate governmental purpose"
could somehow be derived from within the required-rationality
model, it would be difficult to say when the relationship between a
legislative classification and a permissible governmental objective
is "rational." The concept of rationality is itself quite difficult to
apply to legislation, as the Supreme Court's varied use of the term
indicates. 7 9 In most instances, the Court has found legislative clas-
sifications to be "rational" which bear, at most, slight relationships
to the ends served by the statutes, regardless of the incidence or
cost of counterproposals.28 ° In some cases, however, the Court has
used a more utilitarian calculation, condemning as "irrational"
statutes when their underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness has
triggered judicial ire.28' Thus, although "rationality" in other con-
texts is used to denote the balancing of a proposal's costs and ben-
efits,282 the Supreme Court has varied its use of the term, some-
times simply asking if a classification creates any positive benefits
whatsoever, and occasionally demanding a clear showing of net
benefit.
Judge Learned Hand has written that "a law which can get
itself enacted is almost sure to have behind it a support which is
Court, 101 S.Ct. 1200, 1208-11 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring).
The statement in the text reflects a deeper conflict, which Roberto Unger describes as
"the antimony of rules and values." R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 91 (1975). Because,
according to Unger, language has no objectively discernable meaning, and because our cul-
ture lacks a broad consensus on values and on how the world is perceived and understood,
legal rules can be applied only by determining whether the application of the rule will serve
its maker's purposes. Under this "purposive theory," judges are given the difficult responsi-
bility of assessing the "instrumental rationality" of a proposed application of a rule. Id. at
95-96.
What is especially problematic about the required-rationality model is the Court's in-
strumental analysis of whether or not a classification serves a legitimate statutory objective
to determine conclusively if the resulting inequality is consistent with the purposes of the
equal protection clause.
278. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27, at 346.
279. See note 274 supra.
280. E.g., Kotch v. River Port Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). See Note, Equal Protec-
tion: A Closer Look at Closer Scrutiny, 76 MICH. L. R.v. 771, 817 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Equal Protection].
281. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 439 (1972).
282. See H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS (1970).
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not wholly unreasonable." 83 Unless some government objectives
are held to be impermissible, any piece of legislation can be justi-
fied as rationally serving the purpose of disadvantaging those
treated unequally.28 Therefore, the ratiopality model requires that
a statutory classification serve a permissible governmental interest.
With the exception of language condemning as impermissible a
"bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group,' 285 however, the Court has failed to articulate a standard
against which governmental objectives may be measured. In any
case, such a standard cannot be derived from any definition of "ra-
tionality," nor from the language of the equal protection clause.
Whether, as some have argued, the list of proscribed government
objectives is drawn from the remainder of the Constitution, Se or
from some other vision of when it is proper to treat individuals
unequally, the requirement that legislation rationally serve permis-
sible government objectives, like the protection-from-prejudice
model, is meaningless without a theory of just and unjust
disadvantaging.
D. Model III: "Wards of the Equal Protection Clause"2 87
1. The Model Described
The equal protection clause has been characterized as a man-
date for the judicial protection of "specially disadvantaged
groups, ' 28 8 which previously have been disadvantaged by the dem-
ocratic branches. According to this theory, the equal protection
clause is a mandate for the judiciary to prevent the government
from inflicting further harm upon groups, particularly blacks,
whose members historically have been the victims of unjust
treatment.
Proponents289 of this model offer two justifications for height-
283. L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 8 (1952).
284. Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Legislative Purpose]. For an example of what Justice Brennan
has described as a "tautological approach to statutory purpose," see United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-78 (1980). Id. at 186-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
285. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
286. See C. BLACK, STRucTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7-8 (1969).
287. Fiss, supra note 20, at 147.
288. Id. at 155.
289. The theory is most strongly and thoughtfully advanced by Owen Fiss. See Fiss,
supra note 20.
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ened judicial protection of disadvantaged groups. The first is that
any redistribution of wealth which results from prohibiting govern-
ment action having a negative impact on a protected group is ap-
propriate compensation for previous damage inflicted upon the
group by the political process.290 The second is that judicial solici-
tude for such groups, including any such redistribution, may have
the effect of ending the group's lower-caste status, an outcome to
be desired for a variety of reasons. 91
The model differs from the approach currently used by the
Supreme Court in several significant respects.292 Like the suspect-
classification doctrine, the "group-disadvantaging principle" 2 3
bars use of a group-identifying characteristic in a statutory distinc-
tion that disadvantages a protected group; however, the model
sanctions "benign" use of such a characteristic in legislation
designed to improve the group's status. Such legislation would re-
ceive only "minimal scrutiny" to determine whether protected
group members would be stigmatized by the statute.29 Such scru-
tiny would be far less strict than that now used by the Court to
test "benign" race and gender classifications.9 5 In addition, the
"wards of the equal protection clause" model condemns govern-
ment actions, whether or not based on a group-identifying classifi-
cation, which have a disparate impact on a protected group, re-
gardless of the intent of the decisionmaking body. The Supreme
Court, on the other hand, assigns great weight to the factor of in-
tent.29 Finally, the model would provide a rationale for compelling
affirmative governmental responses to circumstances, such as pov-
290. Id.
291. Professor Fiss lists three justifications for "the elimination of caste": "preserving
social peace," "maintaining the community. . . as one cohesive whole," and "permitting the
fullest development of individual [group] members." Id. at 151.
292. For example, the Court would be required to repudiate the language in many of
its cases to the effect that "the benefits afforded by the Equal Protection Clause 'are by its
terms, guaranteed to the individual."' Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 526 (1980)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)). See Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 288 (1978) (Powell, J.). See also Brest, supra note
224, at 48-52.
293. Fiss, supra note 20, at 147.
294. Id. at 161.
295. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313
(1977); discussion in text accompanying notes 78-119 supra.
296. See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65-74 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See also discussion in text accompanying notes
78-82 supra.
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erty and lack of educational opportunity, which perpetuate the
lower-class status of a protected group.2 9
7
2. The Model Criticized
To give the protected-wards model substance, its adherents
must supply meaning for the concepts of "group," "disadvantaged
status," and "group harm," which are central to the model's analy-
sis. As with the previous models, each of these notions is open-
ended, being dependent either on a particular social vision or on a
theory of just and unjust disadvantaging.
Every human being has a nearly infinite variety of characteris-
tics. Most, if not all, such traits are shared by other persons, all of
whom could be lumped together into a number of "groups," each
defined by its common characteristic. As Professor Freund aptly
observed "the central problems of a philosophy of equality [are]
the problems of relevant groupings. "298
One proponent of the "wards of the equal protection clause"
model has offered a definition of "group" which spotlights the
model's underlying problems. Professor Fiss defines a "social
group" as having two characteristics: (1) an identity, that is, "a
distinct existence apart from its members," and (2) an "interde-
pendence" between "the identity and well-being of the members of
the group and the identity and well-being of the group .... ,,29
Like all such definitions, this one is tied to the social consensus
about what kinds of characteristics supply individuals with a com-
mon identity; 00 but because that consensus is itself shaped by a
normative vision about what ought to be relevant for determining
how individuals are treated by the state,0 1 reliance on any defini-
tion of "group" inevitably introduces the calculation of "just and
297. See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 487 (1970). See
Fiss, supra note 20, at 168.
298. Freund, The Philosophy of Equality, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 11, 12.
299. Fiss, supra note 20, at 148.
300. In his essay, Fiss is careful to distinguish between "social groups" and "artificial
classes" created by legislation. Id. at 156. But as Unger observed, in a society where "all
values are individual and subjective," all "[g]roups are artificial" because of the absenie of a
common understanding of what characteristics identify real groups. R. UNGER, supra note
277, at 83. See also id. at 236-95.
For a thoughtful articulation of a contrary position, see Horowitz, The Jurisprudence
of Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, 14 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 599, 607 (1979).
301. See Tribe, supra note 229, at 1074-75.
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unjust disadvantaging" into the protected-wards model.
Proponents of the model must next determine which groups
are entitled to be made wards of the equal protection clause. Pro-
fessor Fiss suggests three criteria: (1) that the group be a "social
group"; (2) that it have been "in a position of perpetual subordina-
tion"; and (3) that its political power have been "severely circum-
scribed. 3 0 2 Like the adherents of the protection-from-prejudice
model,0 3 Professor Fiss looks to the treatment afforded certain
groups by the political process to justify selection of these criteria
for identifying protected groups. 4 The "wards of the clause"
model must look to an externally derived theory of what consti-
tutes just and unjust disadvantaging,30 5 however, in order to deter-
mine which groups the political system has wrongfully
subordinated.
Finally, invocation of the protected-wards model requires a
finding that a particular government action has resulted in harm to
a protected group. Finding "group harm" requires determining
which government actions having an unequal impact on a particu-
lar group are condemned by the group-disadvantaging principle.
Although Fiss advocates a conception of "status harm" that pros-
cribes only "state conduct that impairs the status of a specially
disadvantaged group," 8' his theory is by no means the only one
consistent with the "wards of the clause" approach. Impaired
group status is not the only damage visited upon members of
groups found to be "specially disadvantaged. 3 07 Typically, the ef-
fects of discriminatory treatment take far more concrete forms.
These attempts to define group harm reveal once again the inade-
quacy of the model, for in order to arrive at the conclusion that a
particular government action results in proscribed group harm, one
must look beyond the model to some theory about what kind of
injury to a group constitutes unjust disadvantaging.
302. Fiss, supra note 20, at 154-55. According to Professor Fiss, however, possession of
some, but less than all, of the characteristics listed would entitle a group to some "variable
standard" of judicial protection. Id.
303. See text accompanying notes 248-52 supra.
304. Fiss, supra note 20, at 151-55.
305. See text accompanying notes 259-63 supra.
306. Fiss, supra note 20, at 157.
307. See Eisenberg, supra note 244, at 62 (articulating a "causation principle" that
"no person should suffer relative disadvantage at the hands of the government, regardless of
official purpose or intention, if such disadvantage is reasonably attributable to race").
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E. Model IV: Procedural Equal Protection
1. The Model Considered
With increasing frequency during the last several years, the
equal protection clause has been interpreted to require that only
particular decisionmaking bodies following appropriately deliber-
ate procedures may authorize government actions disadvantaging
certain groups.308 This focus on "due process of lawmaking"30 9 re-
quires a court to weigh who made a particular decision, and how it
was made,3 10 when determining whether or not a particular govern-
mental deviation from the norm of equal treatment is constitution-
ally permissible.
To date, the Supreme Court has manifested an interest in
"procedural equal protection" in four contexts.3 11 First, in a line of
cases dating from the Warren era, the Court passed upon the va-
lidity of state constitution and local charter provisions which re-
quired the approval of a specified majority of voters before a par-
ticular government action could be taken. Without ever discussing
the question of how much "legislative" authority could be dele-
gated to, or retained by, the voters, 2 the Court struck down two
measures mandating public referenda before a state or town could
enact open housing legislation313 but upheld provisions requiring
taxpayer consent before a municipality could begin construction of
low-cost housing,31 4 or grant a zoning variance.3 15
Second, the Supreme Court has sometimes refused to consider
a proffered justification for a government action where achieve-
ment of the objective was considered beyond the competence of
308. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 495 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring);
id. at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
309. Linde, supra note 226, at 238.
310. See C. BLACK, supra note 286, at 69-70. In analyzing how a decision was made,
the Court will consider the scope and content of the decisionmakers' deliberatiorts and the
opportunity those disadvantaged by the resulting classification had for an individualized
determination.
311. The voting opportunity cases are not considered as part of the procedural equal
protection model because in those cases the Court did not consider the process by which
particular group-disadvantaging decisions were made; instead, it determined that the right
to participate in the process itself must be provided to all persons equally.
312. See Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HAv. L. REV. 1373, 1402-03 (1978).
313. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
314. James v. Valtierria, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
315. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
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the decisionmaker. In two cases involving the disadvantaging of
aliens, the Court refused to consider the advancement of foreign
policy or the encouragement of naturalization as legitimate objec-
tives for decisionmaking bodies other than the Congress or the
President. 316 Similarly, in Bakke, Justice Powell found that, in the
absence of explicit legislative or judicial authority, the University
of California could not use a race-conscious formula to remedy the
effects of past racial discrimination in society.317
Third, in a much criticized3 8 line of cases, the Supreme Court
struck down rules disadvantaging pregnant women,31 , unwed fa-
thers,32 0 and out-of-state residents,3 21 among others, where it found
that each of the rules contained an "irrebuttable presumption"
conclusively linking an identifying characteristic with a govern-
ment objective. The Court did not explicitly prohibit the govern-
ment from disadvantaging those with the identifying characteris-
tics, it only prohibited the government from doing so without
offering them the opportunity to rebut the inference drawn by the
rule.32 2
Finally, in a number of cases, the Court refused to consider a
proffered justification for a government action in the absence of
evidence that the decisionmaker actually intended to achieve the
asserted objective.3 23 According to one proponent of the procedural
equal protection model, the Court's refusal to weigh any objective
other than the legislature's stated purpose "can improve the quali-
316. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 431 U.S. 1, 10-11 n.13 (1977) (state could not assert encour-
agement of naturalization as justification for denying higher education assistance to resident
aliens not intending to become citizens); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 104-14
(1976) (United States Civil Service Commission could not assert foreign policy as justifica-
tion for barring aliens from employment in Civil Service).
317. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-10 (1978) (Powell, J.).
See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). "It is fundamental that in no organ of gov-
ernment, state or federal, does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power [to ame-
liorate the effects of past discrimination] than in Congress .. " Id. at 483 (Burger, C.J.).
318. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975); Note, Irrebuttable Pre-
sumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Irrebut-
table Presumptions]. The doctrine is discussed in text accompanying notes 434-38 infra.
319. Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975); Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
320. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
321. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
322. Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1534, 1539 (1974).
323. E.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648-52 (1975); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1972). See text accompanying notes 399-416 infra.
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ty of the political process. . . by encouraging a fuller airing in the
political arena of the grounds for legislative action.
324
2. The Model Evaluated
Like each of the other models, the procedural equal protection
model is not without its analytical gaps. The inherent difficulties of
applying the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, the rule against
considering any purposes other than those actually intended by the
legislature, and the "spheres of legislative competence" approach
will be discussed in detail in Part III-C.25 The question presented
here is a deeper one, requiring value judgments regarding how the
Court may determine when a decisionmaker, or a decisionmaking
process, is not the proper vehicle for arriving at a group-dis-
advantaging decision. One theory, examining the point at which
prejudice denies a group full access to the political bargaining pro-
cess, was discussed in Part II-B.2 8
Much like the suspicion of "prejudiced" political processes is
Justice Stevens' stated disregard for legislative conclusions based
on "habit" or "traditional" views rather than on extensive deliber-
ations. 27 Obviously, some habits and traditions are proper, while
others are not. Clearly the problem is not that a legislature has
substituted long and deeply held values for thorough consideration
of an issue; rather, it is that those values may sometimes be
unacceptable.28
Other theories are more frankly dependent upon visions of so-
cial justice currently unfamiliar to equal protection jurispru-
dence.3 29 All of them recognize, as they must, that the determina-
tion of how a disadvantaging decision must be reached is
dependent upon a substantive vision of the relative importance of
competing interests and upon an assessment of the propriety of
324. Gunther, supra note 4, at 44.
325. See text accompanying notes 399-453 infra.
326. See text accompanying notes 248-63 supra.
327. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 557 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 222 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment);
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
328. See J. ELY, supra note 69, at 157.
329. E.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 47, §§ 17-1 to -3; Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269, 307 (1975); Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in
Procedural Due Process, in NoMos XVIII, DuE PRocEss 126, 153 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman
eds. 1977).
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particular procedures."' 0
F. Model V: Mandating "Equal Treatment"' 1
Finally, the equal protection clause may be construed as a de-
mand that the government ensure that all persons are treated
equally with respect to a particular activity or interest. To fulfill
such a demand, the government may be simultaneously prohibited
from distinguishing among "similarly situated" persons and obli-
gated to treat differently those needing assistance in order to en-
gage in an activity on an equal basis with others.3 2 This equal-
treatment model underlies the "fundamental interest" doctrine.33 3
Unlike the other models, the equal-treatment model suffers
from few difficulties in application,s4 for once the government is
required to provide equal treatment with respect to a particular
interest, only the proper limits of that interest are at issue. Thus,
the critical issue in applying the model is whether or not the inter-
est in question is one which the government should be required to
ensure that all persons may enjoy equally. At least since the time
of Aristotle835 the criteria for determining the solution to this
problem have remained in dispute.
Professor Ely has argued that fundamental interests should be
1
330. See Tribe, supra note 229. "The question of whether adjudicative or representa-
tive process is required in a given context simply cannot be analyzed in terms of how fairly
and accurately various participatory processes reflect the interests and inputs of those gov-
erned by them. Deciding what kind of participation the Constitution demands requires
analysis not only of the efficacy of alternative processes but also of the character and impor-
tance of the interest at stake-its role in the life of the individual as an individual. That
analysis, in turn, requires a theory of values and rights as plainly substantive as, and seem-
ingly of a piece with, the theories of values and rights that underlie the Constitution's provi-
sions addressing religion, slavery, and property." Id. at 1069. See also United States Dep't
of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973). The Court must "assess the public and private
interests affected by a statutory classification and then decide in each instance whether in-
dividualized determination is required or categorical treatment is permitted by the Consti-
tution." Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring).
331. See L. TRme, supra note 47, at 992.
332. Id. at 992-93.
333. See text accompanying notes 38-49 supra.
334. One major problem does hamper application of the fundamental interest doc-
trine. Although significant infringements of fundamental rights demand compelling justifi-
cation, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978), reasonable restrictions may be
imposed. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977). The problem, of course, is deciding where to
draw the line. See Developments in the Law-The Constitution and The Family, 93 H~Av.
L. REV. 1156, 1194 (1980).
335. See ARiSTOTLE, POLrTICS, line 1318a-18b.
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confined to voting rights, that is to those rights "that are essential
to the democratic process and. . . whose dimensions cannot safely
be left to our elected representatives, who have an obvious vested
interest in the status quo." ' 8 This intimation that fundamental
rights must be linked to the proper working of the democratic pro-
cess is found in some of the recent equal protection cases.337 As
Professor Michelman has recently argued, however, a vast array of
benefits, including education, "health and vigor, presentable attire,
...[and] shelter, not only from the elements, but from the physi-
cal and psychological onslaughts of social debilitation" may be
"prerequisites of effective participation in democratic representa-
tion."338 Although Professor Ely's formulation may be attractive to
a court concerned with limiting its impact upon the public trea-
sury,33 9 its rationale can be expanded far beyond the narrow
scheme of rights Ely has envisioned.
In a long series of articles, 40 Professor Michelman has sought
to provide a rationale for making "minimal protection"341 of the
poor a part of equal protection. According to Michelman, borrow-
ing from John Rawls, 45 there are a number of "just wants," the
satisfaction of which all would agree are a precondition for any just
society.3 43 The equal protection clause does not demand equality of
all things, only an equal protection "against certain hazards associ-
ated with impecuniousness which even a society strongly commit-
ted to competition and incentives would have to find unjust. 34 4
There is no value-free, way to determine when all persons
should be treated equally by the government, for once the door is
opened to use of the clause as a vehicle for "substantive equal pro-
336. J. ELY, supra note 69, at 170 (footnote omitted).
337. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973). But
see, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). The Burger Court's choice of interests for
extraordinary judicial protection is discussed in text accompanying notes 366-98 infra.
338. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q.
659, 677.
339. See Tribe, supra note 229. "Such an account permits courts to perceive and por-
tray themselves as servants of democracy even as they strike down the actions of supposedly
democratic governments." Id. at 1063 (footnote omitted).
340. E.g., Michelman, supra note 50; Michelman, supra note 338.
341. Michelman, supra note 50, at 35.
342. J. RAWLS, A THEORY oF JusTicE (1971).
343. Michelman, supra note 50, at 15.
344. Id. at 42 (footnote omitted). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 819-20.
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tection, ' 34 5 the Court must look beyond the language of the Four-
teenth Amendment to determine when and with respect to what
interests the government must ensure equal treatment. Thus, like
each of the previous models, the model of equal treatment is de-
pendent on external value judgments to determine when it is just
for the government to cause, or to countenance, inequality.
Ill.
In this segment of the article, by analyzing the extent of the
protection afforded to various groups and interests and by evaluat-
ing the various analytic devices employed by the Court, an attempt
will be made to determine how the five models discussed above
have been applied in the Burger Court's equal protection decisions.
A. The Scope of Protection Given to Various Groups By
the Burger Court
As discussed earlier, 46 the Burger Court has couched most of
its equal protection decisions in the language of the protection-
from-prejudice model.3 47 In determining which level of scrutiny to
use on a statutory classification, it has purported to inquire
whether or not the disadvantaged group has suffered from a his-
tory of "discriminatory" treatment 48 and whether or not such
treatment has required the group to receive "extraordinary...
protection from the majoritarian political process." 9 The Court's
reliance on other criteria for determihing which level of scrutiny to
apply to a classification, however, along with its consistent refusal
to analyze closely a disadvantaged group's status in the political
arena and its willingness to engage in a balancing of the costs and
benefits of particular statutes,3850 reflects both a failure to embrace
fully the norm of equality expressed in the anti-prejudice model
and the problems inherent in applying the model.
345. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27, at 361-65.
346. See text accompanying notes 248-52 supra.
347. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971). But see Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291-300 (1978) (Powell, J.).
348. E.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per
curiam); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion).
349. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) (quoting San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
350. See text accompanying notes 264-65 supra.
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In addition to searching for "prejudice," the Court has some-
times focused on whether or not the characteristic identifying a
disadvantaged group is "immutable. 3 51 Although some immutable
qualities are generally irrelevant to legitimate legislative purposes,
and statutes relying upon them are therefore likely to be motivated
by animus, many classifications based on immutable characteris-
tics, such as "physical ability and intelligence, are typically ac-
cepted as legitimate. 3 5 Thus, either immutability is a criterion for
the selection of groups for judicial protection which is itself irrele-
vant to whether or not the statute in question was motivated by
animus, or, more likely, it is one criterion the Court uses to deter-
mine exactly what "prejudice" is. Whether or not the Court articu-
lates its conclusion that prejudice is involved, however, its use of
immutability as a criterion for selecting the appropriate level of
scrutiny reflects its recognition that it is sometimes unjust to dis-
advantage someone on the basis of a characteristic he or she is
powerless to change.
Although the list of criteria the Court has used to determine
which level of scrutiny is appropriate frequently has been criti-
cized,3 53 the Court's application of these criteria has provoked far
more critical responses. Instead of engaging in a careful analysis of
how much political power a disadvantaged group possesses, the
Court has drawn from its own vision of how much influence a par-
ticular minority can wield and how odious a particular classifica-
tion may be. Thus, legislative classifications disadvantaging
whites,3 4 women, 5 5 men,3 56 and illegitimate children 57 generally
receive little deference from the Court, while those disadvantaging
the aged,3 58 methadone users,359 and recipients of Aid to Families
351. E.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (plurality opinion). See also
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 17-21 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
352. J. ELY, supra note 69, at 150.
353. E.g., id. at 148-55.
354. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
355. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
356. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S., 268 (1979). Heightened judicial scrutiny of classifications
discriminating against men may be ending. But see Michael M. v. Superior Court, 101 S. Ct.
1200 (1981). "[W]e find nothing to suggest that men, because of past discrimination or pecu-
liar disadvantages are in need of the special solicitude of the courts." Id. at 1207-08.
357. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
358. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
359. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
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with Dependent Children6 0 are given a strong presumption of con-
stitutionality. Without attempting a detailed comparison of the
relative social standing and political influence of groups receiving
judicial protection with that of groups not receiving such protec-
tion, it seems fair to observe that no description of American soci-
ety has yet to rank the former groups consistently below the latter
in political power or social status. If the Supreme Court is seeking
to use the equal protection clause to correct a "malfunctioning" of
the political process, 61 it obviously is not attempting to protect
groups from the effects of popular hatred or political impotence. 62
Instead, in a manner reminiscent of the "wards of the equal pro-
tection clause" model, the Court apparently has sought to reverse
the effects of its own rather unusual conception of "prejudice."
Adherents of the protection-from-prejudice model have criti-
cized the Burger Court's apparent inconsistency and have sought
to distinguish its "value-oriented jurisprudence"3 3 from the alleg-
edly neutral judgment dictated by the model. But the model's no-
tion of prejudice is necessarily dependent on a set of value judg-
ments about when it is just to disadvantage individuals on the
basis of a given characteristic.3 " Thus, the only sound criticism of
the Burger Court's selection of groups for heightened protection is
not that it reflects a "value-imposition methodology,"3 65 but that it
reflects a conception of the political power of particular groups and
their "just" place within the society that is inconsistent with the
critics', or our own, ideal of fairness.
B. The Court's Selection of Interests for Heightened Ju-
dicial Protection
As was noted in the previous discussion of the Court and the
poor, 66 the Burger Court has added only one "fundamental inter-
360. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
361. See text accompanying notes 218-25 supra.
362. As critics have pointed out, whites and men have hardly been the subject of wide-
spread animus by those who have made this country's laws. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 69,
at 148-49 n.52. On the other hand, welfare recipients and former addicts have consistently
suffered from societal opprobrium. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S.
568, 603-04 n.8 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 575 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Michelman, supra note 50, at 19-20.
363. J. ELY, supra note 69, at 149 n.52.
364. See text accompanying notes 259-63 supra.
365. J. ELY, supra note 69, at 149 n.52.
366. See text accompanying notes 168-77 supra.
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est," the right to marry, 3 7 to the list of activities with respect to
which individuals have a right to "equal treatment." At the same
time, the Court has rejected demands that educatione3 6 8 housing,3 6
public employment 70 and publicly financed abortion7 , be declared
fundamental interests. In Zablocki v. Redhail, 72 the Court struck
down a Wisconsin law requiring a divorced parent with a court-
imposed child-support obligation to obtain court permission before
remarrying. In its opinion, the Court reaffirmed "the fundamental
character of the right to marry,"373 but unlike its earlier "funda-
mental interest" decisions,3 7 4 the Court explicitly recognized that
the substantiality of a state's justification for regulation of a fun-
damental right is a function of the extent to which the regulation
burdens the exercise of that right:
[W]e do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which
relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites to marriage
must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasona-
ble regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to
enter into the marriage relationship may legitimately be
imposed.37 5
As noted above, the "equal treatment" model, which is the
source of equal protection fundamental interests, must draw mean-
ing from some externally supplied vision of the circumstances
under which the government must treat all persons equally.3 76 A
number of formulations have been advanced as rationales for the
Court's selection of fundamental interests; however, none are to-
tally consistent with the Court's decisions. Some commentators
have argued that interests should be accorded "fundamental" sta-
tus under the equal protection clause if they are protected else-
367. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). Although the right to marry has previ-
ously been recognized as important, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1962), Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), Zablocki is the first equal protection decision squarely rest-
ing on its fundamentality.
368. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), discussed at text
accompanying notes 164-67 supra.
369. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
370. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
371. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
372. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
373. Id. at 386.
374. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
375. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
376. See text accompanying notes 331-44 supra.
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where in the Constitution.3 77 Although this rationale may explain
the Court's decisions regarding the rights to appellate review and
to marital privacy, 7  it fails to explain the Court's holdings in the
abortion and right-to-travel cases.37 The notion, discussed earlier,
that interests are "fundamental" only if they are necessary to allow
an individual to participate fully in the political process is both
open-ended 8 0 and inconsistent with the Court's decisions finding
the rights to marry and to procreate "fundamental.!" 1 As with the
Supreme Court's choice of groups for heightened judicial protec-
tion, its selection of fundamental interests can be attributed only
to the Court's own vision of what constitutes just and unjust
disadvantaging.
The Supreme Court has used a variety of the analytic devices
characteristic of "intermediate" scrutiny to extend some protection
to a number of intimate activities not explicitly deemed "funda-
mental." In Eisenstadt v. Baird,8 2 while purporting to use only a
rational relationship test in "an opinion in which the actual inten-
sity of scrutiny was at variance with the articulated standard,'as
the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute making it more dif-
ficult for unmarried persons than for married persons to obtain
contraceptives. As is necessary to avoid making the required ra-
377. See, e.g., C. BLACK, supra note 286, at 27-28. Perhaps such an interpretation
could explain why the Court occasionally analyzes a statute prohibiting only certain kinds of
speech under the equal protection clause rather than under the First Amendment. See Ca-
rey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); L.
TRBE, supra note 47, at 1002.
378. Both interests have also received protection under the due process clause. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
379. Although in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980), the Court sought to distinguish the right to have an abortion, which found protec-
tion under the due process clause in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), from the right to
have a publicly financed abortion, 432 U.S. at 474, 448 U.S. at 315; it is clear that the state's
attempt to discourage the exercise of a constitutional right was no different from that con-
demned in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (in which no constitutional provision
other than the equal protection clause was used as authority for the proposition that a state
could not discourage a person from exercising the right of interstate travel). See Perry, Why
the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment
on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1113, 1123-25 (1980).
380. See text accompanying notes 326-27 supra.
381. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942).
382. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
383. Gunther, supra note 4, at 36.
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tionality model a tautology,-8' the Court refused to consider two
legislative purposes that were asserted by the Commonwealth at
trial but which appeared to be inconsistent with the language and
history of the statute.3 85 Then, conjuring up another purpose
plainly ill-served by the statute, that of banning contraceptives,
the Court found the statutory distinction on the basis of marital
status irrational, "invidious" and unconstitutional. 88
The commentators are split on a determination of which vi-
sion of the equal protection clause the Court invoked in Eisen-
stadt. Whether the Justices drew upon a determination that some
public purposes are not sufficient to justify limiting an individual's
interest in purchasing contraceptives,8 7 or upon a theory about
how the legislature must reach a decision affecting such an inter-
est,38 8 it is clear that no incantation of "rationality," without more,
can explain the Court's decision. 89
Finally, the Court has extended protection to certain "consti-
tutionally preferred interests"390 by striking down "irrebuttable
presumptions"3 91 and requiring case-by-case determinations that
certain judicially prescribed conditions exist before the govern-
ment may adversely affect those interests. In three cases, the Court
used the irrebuttable presumption doctrine to strike down classifi-
cations infringing upon the constitutionally recognized interest in
child rearing.39 2 The first case invalidated an Illinois law found to
be conclusively presuming unwed fathers to be unfit to have cus-
384. See text accompanying notes 275-84 supra.
385. The Court dismissed the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's finding that
the law was intended to deter premarital sex, noting that unmarried persons could lawfully
obtain contraceptives to prevent disease and that married persons could obtain contracep-
tives without regard to their use. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445-49 (1972). In addi-
tion, the Court examined the history of the statute and determined that the protection of
public health could not have motivated the legislature to enact the limited prohibition. Id.
at 450-52.
386. Id. at 454-55.
387. Professor Gunther has argued that the Court's "rejection of proffered state pur-
poses strongly suggests a value-laden appraisal of the legitimacy of ends." Gunther, supra
note 4, at 35.
388. Id. at 43-47.
389. See Legislative Purpose, supra note 284, at 125-27.
390. Ackerman, The Conclusive Presumption Shuffle, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 761, 774-75
(1977).
391. "Irrebuttable presumptions" are discussed in text accompanying notes 434-38
infra.
392. See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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tody of their children, while granting all other parents the right to
a hearing on fitness. 3 ' The second and third cases struck down
rules "presuming" pregnant women to be incapacitated, thereby
barring them from teaching39 4 and from collecting unemployment
benefits. 95
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine was also used in a case
involving an interest closely linked with the right of interstate
travel. In Vlandis v. Kline, 96 the Court struck down as "not neces-
sarily or universally true in fact"3 '' a Connecticut law which, ac-
cording to the Court, presumed that unmarried applicants to the
University of Connecticut who had legal addresses outside the
state during the prior year, and married applicants who had out-
of-state addresses at the time of application, were nonresidents for
tuition purposes.398
In selecting interests important enough to merit its least def-
erential scrutiny of impinging legislation, the Court has not ad-
hered to completely any one of the models previously discussed.
Though it has drawn from the equal-treatment model in fixing cer-
tain rights as fundamental, its selection of fundamental interests is
more probably attributable to the Court's own ideas about what
constitutes just and unjust disadvantaging. It has rendered deci-
sions in language consistent with the required-rationality model,
yet this model alone does not provide a complete explanation for
the Court's decisions.
393. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654, 657-58 (1972). See text accompanying note
141 supra.
394. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 645-46 (1974) (striking down
mandatory leave of absence for pregnant teacher beginning four months before the expected
birth of her child).
395. Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44, 45-46 (1975) (per
curiam) (striking down Utah statute making women ineligible for unemployment benefits
during last twelve weeks of pregnancy and for six weeks following childbirth).
396. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
397. Id. at 452.
398. See also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (striking down a Texas ban on
voting by military personnel because it was found to presume conclusively that all soldiers
did not reside in the counties where they were stationed).
For an analysis of the Court's selection of interests for protection under the "irrebut-
table presumption doctrine," see notes 434-38 and accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 8:777
INTERMEDIATE EQUAL PROTECTION
C. The Analytic Techniques of Intermediate Scrutiny
1. Failing to Accept a Possible Governmental Objective as a Jus-
tification for a Statutory Classification
The centerpiece of the Supreme Court's analysis of cases aris-
ing under the equal protection clause is its evaluation of possible
government justifications for treating individuals unequally. When
it has concluded that a particular classification fails to advance an
objective of sufficient importance to justify the distinction, the
Court has offered five rationales in support of its conclusion.
a. The Proscription of Illegitimate Purposes
Where the language or history of a statute indicates that the
legislature intended to harm or punish those disadvantaged by the
provision, the Court has sometimes found the legislative motive il-
legitimate. Then, applying the required-rationality model, it has
held that the statute fails to serve rationally a "legitimate govern-
mental interest."3 9 But the determination that a particular motive
is "invidious" states a conclusion, not an analysis. The Court has
not indicated why it is permissible for the legislature to intend to
disadvantage recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren in comparison with other public-benefit recipients400 but im-
permissible to disadvantage deliberately those living in households
consisting of two or more unrelated persons by denying them food
stamps. 0 1 Similarly, the Court has offered no explanation why it is
impermissible for a state to discourage unmarried persons from
purchasing contraceptives40 2 but permissible to discourage indigent
women from having abortions.403 The explanation cannot be found
in the words of the equal protection clause; it is hidden in the
Court's vision of which inequalities are just and which are unjust.
399. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (emphasis in
original). See also Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972) (finding it
"illogical and unjust" to condemn extramarital "liasons" by denying illegitimate children
the right to recover under workmen's compensation law).
400. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 575 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing evidence that a Texas law giving AFDC recipients a lower percentage of "need" level
than that of disabled or aged persons was motivated by unpopularity of AFDC recipients).
401. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
402. This is the proposition for which Eisenstadt v. Baird was cited by the Court in
Carey v. Population Serv. Int','431 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1977).
403. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980).
Summer 1981]
834 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
b. Rejecting Insufficiently Important Objectives
Where a group or interest found to be entitled to heightened
judicial protection is disadvantaged by a statutory classification,
the Court has often required proof by the government that the dis-
tinction serves an "important" governmental objective. 04 In these
cases, the Court has rejected proffered justifications based solely
on improved "efficiency" or "administrative convenience" which
are inherent whenever a rational-basis test is used.40 5 This require-
ment is characteristic of the protection-from-prejudice model.08
Other than by dismissing administrative convenience as inade-
quate and by finding certain "benign" purposes sufficient, how-
ever, 40 7 the Court has failed to indicate its criteria for determining
which governmental objectives are "important" or "compelling."4' 1
c. Examining Only the Legislature's Actual Purpose
In several "intermediate" equal protection decisions, the Su-
preme Court has refused to consider a proffered governmental pur-
pose where the language or history of a statute indicated that the
legislature had not intended to achieve that objective.40 9 This has
404. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976). See L. TRiNE, supra note 47, at
1082-83.
405. E.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151-52 (1980); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973).
406. See text accompanying notes 260-65 supra.
407. To date, members of the Court have found seven purposes sufficiently important
to satisfy the test articulated in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976): (1) remedying the
effects of past racial discrimination, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
360-62 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring and dissenting); (2)
achieving an academically diverse student body, id. at 311 (Powell, J.); (3) remedying the
effects of discrimination against women, Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); (4)
"avoiding difficult problems in proving paternity after the death of an illegitimate child,"
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); (5)
"providing for the well-being of illegitimate children," Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
391 (1979); (6) preventing teenage pregnancy, Michael M. v. Superior Court, 101 S. Ct. 1200,
1216 n.7 (1981) (plurality opinion); id. at 1214-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting); and (7) "raising
and supporting armies," Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2654 (1981). See also Wengler
v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 146 U.S. 142 (1980). "Providing for needy spouses is surely an
important governmental objective." Id. at 151.
408. See Elections Bd. v. Socialist Worker's Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979). "I have never
been able to fully appreciate just what a 'compelling state interest' is. If it means 'convinc-
ingly controlling,' or 'incapable of being overcome' upon any balancing process, then, of
course, the test merely announces an inevitable result, and the test is no test at all." Id. at
188 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
409. E.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 449 (1972).
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occurred most frequently in cases involving gender discrimination,
in which the Court has generally struck down statutes favoring wo-
men except where it found that the decisionmaker actually in-
tended to redress the effects of past discrimination or to achieve
some other "important" objective.4 10 Recent decisions, however,
suggest that a majority of the Court will consider any purpose
proffered by the defenders of the legislative classification, even if
there is convincing evidence that few, if any, legislators sought to
achieve it. 4
11
Scrutinizing only a decisionmaker's actual purpose is consis-
tent with two of the models previously discussed. Where a legisla-
ture enacts a law because of a hostile motive, the protection-from-
prejudice model would condemn the statute even if it actually did
serve legitimate state objectives.1 2 However, without some theory
regarding which legislative motives are proscribed, considering
only a statute's "actual" purpose is a meaningless exercise because
any classification is likely to dovetail with the objective that moti-
vated enactment of the statute.413
The "actual purpose" requirement may also reflect use of the
procedural equal protection model. As Gerald Gunther argued,
considering only those purposes that actually motivated the legis-
lature may improve the quality of legislative deliberations by com-
pelling decisionmakers to state their real reasons for enacting a
new law, thereby increasing their political accountability.' 1 ' Al-
410. Compare Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 216 (1977) with Califano v. Webster,
430 U.S. 313, 317-18 (1977).
411. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 101 S. Ct. 1200, 1204-07 (1981) (plurality opinion).
For a debate between two Justices about whether the Court has ever accepted the argument
that it may consider only the legislation's actual purpose, see Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 101 S. Ct. 1309, 1322 n.3 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result
and arguing the affirmative); id. at 1332 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting and arguing the
negative).
412. Writing for a four-judge plurality in Michael M. v. Superior Court, 101 S. Ct.
1200 (1981), Justice Rehnquist rejected the proposition that the equal protection clause con-
demns a statute enacted in part because of an "illicit" legislative motive. "[T]he only ques-
tion under the Federal Constitution-is whether the legislation violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause . . ., not whether its supporters may have endorsed it for reasons no longer
generally accepted. Even if [an impermissible objective] were one of the motives of the stat-
ute ... [the] argument must fail because 'it is a familiar practice of constitutional law that
this court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged
illicit legislative motive."' Id. at 1206 n.7 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
383 (1968)).
413. See text accompanying note 284 supra; J. ELY, supra note 69, at 126 n.34.
414. See Gunther, supra note 4, at 47. See also United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
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though this rationale has provoked a great deal of criticism from
other commentators, 15 there is little indication in the Court's
opinions that it has employed the procedural equal protection
model when it has "limit[ed] the use of afterthought. '416
d. Refusing to Consider Purposes Not Argued by a Classifica-
tion's Defenders
Where a decisionmaker's apparent purpose has become con-
troversial, and where, perhaps as a result, government counsel
failed to assert that objective as a justification for the classifica-
tion, the Court has occasionally refused to consider it as a rationale
for the rule.417 Proponents of this approach have argued that re-
quiring government lawyers to articulate justifications for a statute
enhances the accountability of the political process.1 8 But because
government counsel may fail to assert a justification for a variety
of reasons,41 9 and because many equal protection issues arise in
cases between private parties,420 this justification for "requiring
current articulation '421 is not persuasive.422
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 187-193 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (refusing to accept "a justifica-
tion suggested by government attorneys, but never adopted by Congress," where there was a
suspicion "that Congress may have been misled" by the lobbyists who drafted the statute);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Where "the classification was not adequately
...explained by a statement of legislative purpose," Justice Stevens would reach a "more
tentative holding of unconstitutionality based on a failure to follow procedures that guaran-
tee the kind of deliberation that a fundamental constitutional issue ...merits." Id. at
2811-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). But see Tushnet, supra note 245, argu-
ing that "suspensive vetoes [like that suggested by Justice Stevens] are often a charade." Id.
at 1059-60.
415. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 69. "It is difficult to imagine that accountability
would be enhanced by such a system: an individual legislator would remain free to disavow
some of the purposes listed [in a statutory preamble designed to mention objectives suffi-
cient to justify the measure] and to attribute others that seem useful to his or her under-
standing of the [legislative history]." Id. at 128.
416. L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 1085.
417. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 641 n.9 (1974). According
to Professor Ely, the Supreme Court "seems to ignore [this approach] more often than it
invokes it." J. ELY, supra note 69, at 125 (footnote omitted).
418. See Gunther, supra note 4. "A state court's or attorney general office's descrip-
tion of purpose should be acceptable. If the Court were to require an articulation of purpose
from an authoritative state source, rather than hypothesizing one of its own, there would at
least be indirect pressure on the legislature to state its own reasons for selecting particular
means and classifications." Id. at 47.
419. See J. ELY, supra note 69, at 126-27.
420. E.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
421. L. TRIE, supra note 47, at 1083.
422. Note, however, that because a "lawyer wants to win, and in order to do so is
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e. Manipulating the Formulation of the Legislature's Objective
Finally, in order to find a distasteful classification "irrational,"
the Court may describe the legislature's motivation as the achieve-
ment of a single, narrow objective.423 Because, as was discussed
earlier, most statutes are the result of a compromise struck by sev-
eral interest groups,4 2 ' formulating the legislative purpose in terms
of only one goal will maximize the appearance of underinclusive-
ness or overinclusiveness, which often is a deliberate result of po-
litical bargaining.425 Therefore, in order to condemn a stitute by
scrutinizing the breadth of its objective, the Court must require a
closer "fit"-a smaller incidence of overinclusiveness or underin-
clusiveness-than is normally required under the rational-relation-
ship standard.
2. Demanding "Close Fit'426
When a group found to require heightened protection is disad-
vantaged by a classification, the Supreme Court has often required
that the classification be "substantially related" to the statute's
purposes in order to justify the inequality.427 This requirement of
"close fit" constitutes a demand that a classification describe most
of those included within the ambit of the statutory objective and
few of those falling outside the scope of the legislative purpose. 28
Although "close fit" has been explicitly required in many decisions
involving classifications based on race, gender, alienage and illegiti-
mate birth,2 9 the Court sometimes has condemned overinclusive-
ness and underinclusiveness when important interests were in-
likely to rely on any purpose that will help-that is, any that is not flat-out unconstitu-
tional," J. ELY, supra note 69, at 126 (footnote omitted), the requirement of current articu-
lation is unlikely to result in the invalidation of many statutes.
423. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See Legislative Purpose, supra
note 284, at 135.
424. See Linde, supra note 226. "[Tihe ineffectiveness of a law to achieve its goal may
be itself a policy. . . and may be the price for permitting the law to reach enactment." Id.
at 233.
425. Legislative Purpose, supra note 284, at 137.
426. L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 1083.
427. E.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977).
428. See generally, Equal Protection, supra note 280.
429. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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fringed upon by statutory rules.43 0
The "close fit" requirement is consistent with the protection-
from-prejudice model's "search" for illicit legislative motive.431 As
was concluded earlier, however, the verbal formulations constitut-
ing strict and intermediate scrutiny simply mask judicial weighing
of the benefits and harms of any given statutory classification. 32
Filtered through the model, the "close fit" requirement may be
viewed as a command to the government to avoid unnecessarily
disadvahitaging members of a protected group. 3
3. Condemning Irrebuttable Presumptions
For a brief period during the first half of the 1970's, the Su-
preme Court often condemned "conclusive presumptions" when a
government classification adversely affected certain important in-
terests.' 3 ' In these cases, the Court did not prohibit the state from
taking the characteristic embodied in the statutory classification
into account; instead, it required that an individual disadvantaged
by the classification be given an opportunity to rebut the presump-
tion linking the characteristic to the government objective. Con-
demning an irrebuttable presumption has the effect of reallocating
decisionmaking authority to officials charged with determining
whether the government purpose purportedly served by the initial
classification would actually be served by disadvantaging a particu-
lar individual.3 5 Consequently, the individual is granted the op-
portunity to participate in the decisionmaking process, a result
favorable both for instrumental reasons and because such partici-
pation may enhance the individual's sense of dignity.4 36
"[B]ecause virtually any summarily classifying rule is suscepti-
ble to challenge as a conclusive presumption,' 437 however, the Su-
430. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
431. See text accompanying notes 235-37 supra.
432. See text accompanying notes 262-65 supra.
433. As Owen Fiss pointed out, "[fln contrast to the case of shoes, the concept of fit
[in equal protection doctrine] ... has no quantative content." Fiss, supra note 20, at 121.
Thus, requirements that a statute be "substantially related to" or "necessary to achieve" a
legislative purpose are susceptible of considerable manipulation by a court, particularly if no
indication is given about how the costs of using alternative classifications are to be weighed.
See Equal Protection, supra note 280.
434. See text accompanying notes 390-98 supra.
435. See L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 1095, 1097.
436. Id.
437. Irrebuttable Presumptions, supra note 318, at 450 (footnote omitted).
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preme Court must offer some set of qualifying criteria to deter-
mine whether adjudication is required or rulemaking is sufficient
when a particular interest is adversely affected by a legislative clas-
sification. But other than some vague language in a 1975 per
curiam decision,3 8 the Court has offered no indication of which
interests the government may not infringe upon through the use of
summary classifications. Perhaps the difficulty of such a task, or
the obvious need to explain any selection criteria in terms of judi-
cial value judgments that have rarely been made openly, has con-
vinced the Court to abandon the doctrine in its infancy.
4. Delineating Spheres of Decisionmaking Competence
In a number of recent equal protection cases, the Supreme
Court has drawn upon its own conception of the proper allocation
of decisionmaking authority among the branches and agencies of
government. It has rejected a proffered justification for a classifica-
tion that it found was not illegitimate per se, but which was be-
yond the authority of the agency drawing it. For example, in
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,43 9 the Court struck down a United
States Civil Service Commission regulation barring aliens from the
federal civil service. In so doing, it refused to consider the Commis-
sion's asserted objective of encouraging nationalization, finding
this to be properly a concern for Congress rather than for the
agency.440 Later developments in the case make it clear that it was
dissatisfaction with the decisionmaker, not with the disqualifica-
tion, that motivated the Court's decision.4 1
438. Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975). "The Four-
teenth Amendment requires that [a state] must achieve legitimate state ends through more
individualized means when basic human liberties are at stake." Id. at 46. This was the last
time a statute was condemned as a conclusive presumption. See New York City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592 n.38 (1979) (finding "no merit" in District Court's "due
process argument" that the Authority's rule against employing methadone users created an
irrebuttable presumption of unemployability).
439. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
440. Id. at 103. Cf. Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2652 (1981) (discussing the
Courts' "healthy deference to legislative and executive judgment in the area of military af-
fairs"); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 483 (1980) (Congress has "broad remedial pow-
ers" to ameliorate the effects of past race discrimination).
441. After the Court's decision, President Ford issued an executive order barring resi-
dent aliens from the Federal Civil Service. Exec. Order No. 11,935, 5 C.F.R. § 7.4 (1980).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court decision upholding the constitutionality of the
executive order. Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980). But see Ma-
thews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976).
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The Court has also varied its approach to classifications dis-
advantaging aliens according to whether or not the role from which
noncitizens were barred was, in the Court's opinion, an integral
part of a state's political process. Where an alien was prohibited
from serving in a position that "involves discretionary decision-
making, or execution of policy, which substantially affects mem-
bers of the political community, '442 the Court has applied "mini-
mal scrutiny. '44 Elsewhere, as previously noted, the Court has
applied strict scrutiny to state statutes discriminating on the basis
of alienage.444
The Court has also found that legislation "[iln the area of eco-
nomics and social welfare ' 445 is peculiarly within the competence
of the political branches and has required only a "reasonable ba-
sis" for classifications in statutes directed to these cases. The deci-
sions striking down social welfare legislation,446 however, indicate
that the invocation of the Dandridge formulation states a descrip-
tion of, not the justification for, the Court's very deferential
approach.
Every attempt to rest an equal protection decision upon a de-
termination of the proper allocation of decisionmaking authority
requires reference to some set of value judgments concerning the
qualities a rulemaking body must possess in order to be adjudged
competent to disadvantage a particular group or interest. Although
some of the Court's opinions rely upon explicit Constitutional
grants of decisionmaking authority to Congress or the executive,
other opinions fail to explain the reason for judicial deference.447
5. Characterizing the Classification
Where a legislative scheme does not explicitly identify the
classes receiving different treatment, the Court has considerable
freedom in characterizing affected groups or interests. For exam-
442. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978).
443. Id.
444. See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
445. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
446. E.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); United States Dep't of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
447. Compare Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2649 (1981) (deferring to Congres-
sional judgment in light of Constitutional delegation of power to raise and support armies)
with Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (no textual explanation for Court's
deference to state judgments in one area of economics and social welfare).
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pie, in Geduldig v. Aiello,448 a'provision denying unemployment
disability benefits to pregnant women was described by the major-
ity as a distinction between "pregnant women and non-pregnant
persons ' 449 requiring only minimal scrutiny, while the dissenters
found a gender-based classification demanding strict scrutiny.450
The importance of how a classification is characterized stems
from the approach taken by the Court to equal protection cases.
Because the Court purports to analyze only classifications,4 1 not
outcomes, and because the characterization of a rule determines
which level of scrutiny must be applied,45 2 the outcome of the bat-
tle over the fate of a rule can be determined by the description of
those. disadvantaged by it.4 as
Conclusion
The answer to the question of "what inequalities are tolerable
under what circumstances4 , 54 lies not in the mechanical applica-
tion of various standards of review, 455 but in a vision of what con-
448. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
449. Id. at 496 n.20.
450. Id. at 502-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347,
351 (1979); id. at 361, in which the Justices split 5-4 on whether a Georgia statute (denying
the father, but not the mother, of an illegitimate child the right to recover for a child's
wrongful death unless the father had legally acknowledged the child) contained a gender-
based classification.
451. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
452. Compare Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (rule disadvantaging only some
resident aliens found inherently suspect) with Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (rule
disadvantaging only some women upheld using minimal scrutiny).
453. Cf. Karst & Horowitz, supra note 94, at 22. (in which the authors described Jus-
tice Powell's opinion in Bakke: "[F]or Justice Powell, the standard of review is not merely
the reflection of some equal protection principle: it is the principle").
The intent requirement articulated in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), may be
understood as an effort to avoid the classificatory problems discussed herein. See text ac-
companying notes 78-81 supra. Compare Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) with Per-
sonnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
454. J. ELY, supra note 69, at 32.
455. After reviewing the Supreme Court's recent equal protection cases, Professors
Karst and Horowitz concluded that "in focusing on the standard of review, the Court gave
insufficient attention to matters of substance. If its decisions are to be seen as principled,
the Court must explain its principles as elaborations of substantive values in the Constitu-
tion. What is needed, then, is not further refinement of judicial methodology, but clear
statement of the substantive meaning of equal protection." Karst & Horowitz, supra note
94, at 24. Recent developments suggest that the Court may be beginning to retreat from its
total reliance on standards of review. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981).
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stitutes just and unjust disadvantaging. As was discussed earlier,
however, no single understanding of the meaning of the equal pro-
tection clause animates the Supreme Court's selection of groups
and interests for heightened protection or its use of various ana-
lytic devices to decide particular cases. Indeed, the Burger Court
has simply failed to explain what its "theory of justice" is.456
Planted in its opinions, however, are the seeds of five models of
equal protection, each of which articulates one or more norms that
help to distinguish just from unjust government regulation. But
because they are dependent on the more specific value judgments
necessary to decide real cases, the models of equal protection, like
the clause itself, can only serve as lenses through which to contem-
plate the value of equality.
"We do not think that the substantive guarantee of due process or certainty in the law will
be advanced by any further 'refinement' in the applicable tests.... Announced degrees of
'deference' to legislative judgment, just as levels of 'scrutiny' which this Court announces
that it applies to particular classifications made by a legislative body, may all too readily
become facile abstractions used to justify a result. Id. at 2654. On "the fruitless controversy
over standards of review," see Tushnet, Book Review, 78 MIcH. L. REv. 694, 701 (1980).
456. That the Court has failed to do so is hardly surprising, in light of the fact that a
coherent theory of the proper limits on governmental authority depends on a consistent
vision of the role of the individual in a liberal society. See Kennedy, The Structure of
Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 205, 360-62, 382 (1979). Professor Kennedy
argues that there is an inherent contradiction between the ideal of individual freedom and
the "communal coercive action that is necessary to achieve it," which dooms to failure any
attempt to derive a consistent set of assumptions covering the proper spheres of individual
and collective conduct. Id. at 211. If so, a more candid attempt by the Court to outline the
normative premises underlying its equal protection decisions can do little to save constitu-
tional theory from the inherent contradiction. See Tushnet, supra note 245, at 1060-62.
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